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ABSTRACT 
 
Full Name : [Mohammed Abdullah AL-Mehdhar] 
Thesis Title : [Performance Evaluation of IPv6 BGP based Solutions for 
Malicious ISP Blocking] 
Major Field : [Computer Networks] 
Date of Degree : [December 2013] 
    The objective of this thesis is to evaluate several BGP-based techniques to 
overcome the intentional Internet blocking that is caused by a malicious Internet Service 
Provider (ISP) while assuming that the Internet is running IPv6. We evaluate the BGP-
based solutions while controlling the incoming and outgoing traffic through a non-
malicious ISP. The first contribution of this thesis is the implementation of the problem 
model and the BGP tuning methods using OPNET for IPv6 networks. The implemented 
methods are AS-Path, shortening, more specific prefixes, using of community, and 
local-preference. The second contribution is evaluating the BGP based solutions by 
discussing packet drop, convergence time, links throughput and application throughput. 
Based on the results obtained, the more specific prefix method has the lowest 
convergence time while the shortening and community methods have almost the same 
convergence time. However, the community method has the lowest dropped packets 
percentage. All methods have almost the same performance for the throughput. The 
third contribution is performing a comparison between our results and the IPv4 results 
xvi 
obtained by Alrefai [1]. Based on the results obtained, the more specific prefix method 
has the lowest convergence time while the shortening and community methods have 
almost the same convergence time. However, the community method has the lowest 
dropped packets percentage. All methods have almost the same performance for the 
throughput. Finally, the results of the performance evaluation were compared against 
the results obtained by Alrefai [1]. 
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 ملخص الرسالة
 
 
  محمد عبدالله عمر المحضار م الكامل:ــــــالاس
 لمشكلة الحجب من مزود  )PGB(تقييم الأداء للحلول المعتمدة على برتوكول بوابة الحدود       :عنوان الرسالة
  6vPIالانترنت الدولي لبرتوكول الانترنت                                                            
 التخصص: شبكات
 تاريخ الدرجة العلمية: ديسمبر 2013
على بروتوكول بوابة الحدود  المعتمدة] 1هو تقييم الحلول المقدمة من الباحث الرفاعي [ الرسالةالهدف من هذه 
هذه  .)6vPI) لحل مشكلة حجب الانترنت عن منطقة محلية باستخدام برتوكول الجيل الثاني من برتوكول الانترنت (PGB(
الدراسة تهتم بالحجب المتعمد من قبل مزود الانترنت الخبيث للمنطقة المحلية مع استمراره الاعلان عن وجود مسارات عبرة 
الحدودية بالتحكم بالحزم الصادرة والواردة للمنطقة المحلية عبر مزود اخر غير  البوابةللمنطقة المحلية. قمنا بتقييم حلول 
). كذلك قمنا بتقييم أداء هذه 6vPI) لبروتوكول الانترنت (TENPOمحاكاة باستخدام برنامج الـ (بعمل نموذج  خبيث. قمنا
الحلول من حيث الحزم المسقطة، وقت التقارب، والانتاجية، بالإضافة لبعض القياسات الخاصة بتطبيقات محددة. وفي الاخير 
]0تي حصل عليها الباحث الرفاعي [القمنا بمقارنة النتائج المتحصل عليها من تجاربنا مع النتائج 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE PROBLEM  
1.1. Introduction 
The Internet has become part of modern human civilization, and the influence 
of the Internet has touched every aspect of life. The way information is retrieved has 
also changed drastically, as news and information can be accessed instantly from 
anywhere in the world through the Internet. Most of the conventional services have been 
changed to match the Internet environment. TV and radio, business applications that 
give new services such as e-shopping, banking services and e-governments, have all 
adapted to the Internet. 
In this respect, the Internet provides more sophisticated services such as voice 
over IP, video calls and instant messaging services, which have paved the way for 
interactive websites such as social networking sites. All these network services 
demonstrate the demand for communication infrastructure that will guarantee their 
stability and availability. 
Reaching any of these services requires the user to have Internet access. Home, 
office, university or public access points are different types of networks that users can 
utilize to connect to the Internet. When a user connects to the Internet through an 
Internet Service Provider (ISP), that user becomes part of the ISP network. This network 
in turn connects to a larger network and becomes part of that network and so on. The 
Internet is basically a network of networks. A network that works under a single 
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administration is referred to as an Autonomous System (AS). An AS could be a local or 
an international ISP (IISP).  
When information is sent or received over the Internet, it actually moves from 
the user’s ISP network to another ISP network until it reaches its final destination. The 
routing process in the Internet can be classified into two phases. The first phase is an 
internal phase, where the routing process controls the traffic inside an AS. The second 
phase is the exterior routing process, where it controls the traffic between different 
ASes. The later phase is done through Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), which is the 
inter-AS routing protocol of the Internet. BGP selects the best path using a combination 
of different rules [2]. Accordingly, the selected path is not necessarily the shortest path, 
but rather the best that matches the ASes routing policies. Thus, the BGP routing is 
called policy-based routing [3]. 
For the Internet routing to proceed, an Internet Protocol (IP) address is needed. 
The currently deployed version of IP addresses is IP version 4 (IPv4). However, due to 
the growing demands for Internet access, IPv4 addresses are being very rapidly 
depleted. To address this problem, different types of solutions have been proposed such 
as Network Address Translation (NAT). Another proposed solution is IP version 6 
(IPv6) which is considered to be the next generation of Internet protocols. IPv6 solves 
the IPv4 address limitation by increasing the IP address from 32 bits to 128 bits. In 
addition, IPv6 has more new and enhanced features such as enhanced security, new 
flexible header and fast handover [4]. 
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Due to the high dependency on the Internet for all aspects of our lives, the 
Internet needs to be stable and resilient. Disasters, human mistakes or malicious 
behaviors are examples of causes of Internet outage which can result in different levels 
of damage. 
 In general, outage causes can be classified into deliberate and non-deliberate. 
Depending on the type and the level of outage, an AS that experiences an Internet outage 
becomes isolated from the entire Internet or from parts of it. 
This study aims to evaluate several BGP-based techniques to overcome the 
intentional Internet blocking caused by a malicious ISP while assuming that the Internet 
is running IPv6. None of the new features of IPv6 BGP have been used in this study. 
These techniques are evaluated in a simulation environment to assess their performance 
with respect to convergence time and effect on Internet applications. 
1.2. Motivation 
As IPv6 is expected to be deployed soon in Saudi Arabia, the Internet resiliency 
against outages is one of the main concerns. However, Internet resiliency can be 
compromised and Internet outage may happen as a result of different types of malicious 
activities. Thus, in order to prevent an outage and to provide a higher level of Internet 
resiliency, the outage causes must be investigated and preventive and recovery solutions 
should be proposed. In this study, we consider IPv6 and BGP-4 attributes and methods 
as possible solutions to providing higher level of Internet resiliency. Problem 
Description 
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An Internet outage may occur because of deliberate or non-deliberate reasons, 
and can result in different levels of blocking. The target of the blocking can be at the 
hardware level or at the software level. The hardware level blocking includes link or 
router blocking. On the other hand, the software level blocking may be divided into 
network level and application level. At the network level, a change in the BGP 
configuration could lead to blocking a specific region. On the other hand, an application 
level blocking can occur by falsifying DNS messages or denying access to the DNS 
service. 
The most effective and widely used method to cause an Internet blocking is the 
network level blocking that can be achieved by blocking IP traffic at the network layer. 
Access Control List (ACL) commands can be used to achieve incoming and outgoing 
traffic blocking for a specific IP address. In this work, we consider the blocking of IP 
traffic at the network layer. 
In general, the blocking of IP traffic by a malicious ISP happens when two 
conditions are met:  
1. The traffic goes through the malicious ISP's network. 
             2. The malicious ISP drops packets that carry the targeted source or destination     
                 IP addresses.  
Hence, the blocking of IP traffic by a malicious ISP problem can be resolved by 
eliminating one or both of these conditions. Subsequently, two classes of solutions can 
be considered: Solutions to control the traffic path, so that it does not pass through the 
5 
malicious ISP; and solutions to prevent traffic from being dropped at the malicious ISP 
by concealing the traffic identity.  
This study focuses on evaluating the performance of the BGP solutions for the 
blackholing of the traffic originating from or destined for the local region that is caused 
by the malicious ISP. The solutions considered by this study are based on controlling 
traffic through the use of BGP over IPv6. 
Specifically, Figure 1.1 shows the four parts of the studied network: local region, 
malicious ISP AS, good ISP AS, and other ASes. All these parts are running BGP over 
IPv6. The malicious ISP AS is blocking traffic coming from and going to the local 
region. Moreover, the malicious ISP AS continues advertising reachability to the 
blocked region to other ASes. 
Figure 1. 1 Malicious ISP blocking of the traffic in the region concerned. 
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Hence, the major goal of this study is to evaluate the performance of the BGP-
based solutions identified by Alrefai [1] when IPv6 networks are considered, and to 
provide enhancements whenever possible. The study will be accomplished by 
conducting OPNET [5] simulations under different scenarios including the use of 
different traffic loads and network applications. Furthermore, the study will compare 
the different solutions based on the convergence time and effect on Internet applications. 
1.3. Summary of Contributions 
 Implementing the problem model and the BGP tuning methods that were proposed 
by Alrefai [1] using OPNET for IPv6 networks. 
 Evaluating the BGP-Based solutions for different application types, different 
background traffic load, and different Internet delay times. 
 Comparing results obtained by Alrefai [1] for IPv4 with our IPv6 results. 
 
 
7 
CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Background 
The vision of the Internet having the users being connected anytime and 
anywhere is becoming more and more a reality. One of the critical enabling technologies 
for workstations and servers for global connectivity is the emergence of the Internet, 
which interconnects different ASes. Users can access the Internet using DSL, cable, 
wireless, dial-up lines, or any type of Internet access services provided by a local ISP. 
Local ISPs are categorized astier-3 ISPs in the Internet structure. 
The two types of relationships between ISPs are Transit and Peering. Transit 
interconnection is a provider-customer relationship. It simply exists when an ISP sells 
dedicated access to its customer ISPs via private leased-line circuits. The customer ISPs 
pay for the Internet access in this type of interconnection. 
Peering, on the other hand, refers to an interconnection between two ISPs to 
exchange traffic for the mutual benefit of both parties. Each ISP provides the other ISP 
with access to its networks and customers' networks. This interconnection does not 
involve payments for the access service, and hence, it is sometimes called "settlement-
free peering" to reflect the fact of cost-free interconnection. There are two types of 
peering, depending on the physical connections that are used: private peering, where a 
point-to-point link is used to physically connect the two ISPs, and public peering, where 
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multiple ISPs are interconnected at an Internet Exchange Point (IXP) using a shared 
switch fabric [6].  
2.2. Internet Protocol 6 (IPv6) 
The Internet was built upon IPv4 protocol, which was widely deployed and 
provided unique global computer addressing and connectivity between computers. 
However, due to the extended dependency and the high growth of the Internet services, 
IPv4 suffered from address exhaustion, routing problems [7] and security issues. IPv6 
is a new version of the Internet protocol that was designed by the Internet Engineering 
Task Force (IETF) [8]. IPv6 was mainly proposed to increase the number of bits used 
in the IP addresses from 32 bits to 128 bits [4]. The following subsection further explains 
the additional IPv6 features and benefits. 
2.2.1. IPv6 Features and Benefits 
As IPv6 is the successor of IPv4, it inherits the existing features of IPv4 and 
provides new services and capabilities. The following is a description of the features 
and the benefits of IPv6 [8]. 
 
Increased Address Space: IPv6 increases the address size from 32 bits to 128 bits. 
Extending the address space to 128 bits offers the following two additional benefits: 
1. Better Applications Functionality: Since IPv4 suffers from address exhaustion, 
there have been different solutions proposed to solve this problem such as the 
use of Network Address Translation (NAT). However, these solutions created 
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additional problems such as server reachability problems. Accordingly, IPv6 
provides a unique IP address to each device which results in simplifying the 
operation of peer-to-peer applications and networking. 
2. Enhanced Transparency: Each end system will be assigned a unique address; 
no need for address translation for IPv6, which enhances the transparency. 
Streamlined Packet Format: The IPv6 header was designed to reduce the 
common case processing cost of packet handling, and to keep the bandwidth cost of the 
IPv6 header as low as possible. 
Auto-configuration: For auto-configuration, IPv4 uses DHCP, which is called 
stateful auto-configuration. IPv6 supports both stateful and stateless auto-configuration. 
In a stateless auto-configuration, a DHCP server is not required to obtain addresses, and 
instead it uses router advertisements to create a unique address. Thus, this mechanism 
offers a “plug-and-play” environment that simplifies address management, and 
administration configuration and reconfiguration.  
Scalability of Multicast: Multicast is the ability to send a single packet to 
multiple nodes in the network. IPv4 supports multicast by using multicast addresses, but 
IPv6 provides a much larger pool of multicast addresses with multiple scoping options. 
IPv6 multicast provides several communication ways with groups, routers or hosts. 
Improved Security: IPv4 suffers from different types of security issues such as 
denial of service, repudiation, sniffing attack and others. For this reason, IPv6 was 
designed with built-in IPsec protocol that provides much better security enhancement. 
IPv6 includes the definition of extensions, which provide support for authentication, 
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data integrity and confidentiality. This is included as a basic element of IPv6 and will 
be included in all implementations. 
Better Quality-of-Service: Traffic handling and identifying have been improved 
in IPv6 by using new fields that were added to the IPv6 header. For example, the 24-bit 
Flow Label field in the IPv6 header is a bit sequence that identifies a stream of packets 
sent from a particular source to a particular destination for which the source desires 
special handling by the intervening routers. From a networking point of view, the quality 
of service (QoS) refers to data loss, latency or jitter, and bandwidth. In order to 
implement QoS marking, IPv6 provides an 8-bit traffic-class field. 
Speed: IPv6 will have reduced end-to-end delay when compared with IPv4 due 
to many reasons. The IPv6 design includes an end-to-end fragmentation that reduces the 
router's load of handling fragmented packets. By reducing the work required by routers 
to split and identify data, the overall end-to-end delay is reduced and the workload along 
the transport path goes down. Moreover, the header of IPv6 has been designed in a way 
to speed-up the routing process. In addition, IPv6 eliminated the need for integrity-
checking of packets during transit, leaving this to higher layer such as Transmission 
Control Protocol (TCP). As such, an IPv6 router will be able to forward the data faster 
than in the case of an IPv4 router. 
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2.3. Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) 
Routing in the Internet is categorized into two parts: the internal fine-grained 
portions that are managed by an Internal Gateway Protocol (IGP), and the interactions 
between ASes via an External Gateway Protocol (EGP). IGP protocols learn about 
routes to networks that are internal to the AS, hence the name Interior. Some examples 
of IGP protocols include Routing Information Protocol (RIP) and Open Shortest Path 
First Protocol (OSPF). On the other hand, EGP protocols are used for routing between 
networks, especially on the Internet backbone itself, linking the different ASes 
together. BGP is the most common EGP in use on the Internet. 
2.3.1. BGP Attributes 
The following is a list defining and describing important BGP attributes that are 
used in the BGP path selection process [5]: 
Weight: A Cisco-defined attribute that is local to a router. This attribute is NOT 
advertised to any BGP neighbor. A path with a high weight value is preferred over a 
path with a low weight value. 
Local-preference: Used to influence outbound path selection. If there are 
multiple exit points out of a BGP AS, then a path with the highest local-preference value 
will always be the preferred path out. Unlike the weight attribute, the local-preference 
attribute is propagated throughout the local AS. 
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Multi-exit discriminator (MED): When a path includes multiple exit or entry 
points to an AS, this value may be used as a metric to discriminate between them. A 
path with a lower MED value is preferred over a path with a higher MED value. 
AS-Path: This is a list of autonomous system numbers that describes the 
sequence of ASes through which this route description has passed. This is a critically 
important attribute since it contains the actual path of autonomous systems to the 
network. It is used to calculate routes and to detect routing loops. 
eBGPmultihop: Multi-hop is used to allow two routers that do not share a direct 
physical connection to establish a BGP peering session. When a BGP router exchanges 
routes with another BGP router the BGP peering occurs. There are two types of peering 
sessions. First, an external BGP (eBGP) is used to establish a connection between two 
non-directly connected external peers such that the connected peers appear to be 
neighbors of each other. Second, an internal BGP (iBGP) peering is used inside an 
autonomous system. The multihop is used only for eBGP and not for iBGP. 
Origin: A mandatory attribute that defines the origin of the path information. 
The origin attribute can assume one of three values as explained in the following table: 
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Table 1.1 BGP ORIGIN Codes 
ORIGIN  
Code 
ORIGIN 
Code Name 
             Description 
 
0 
 
IGP 
The route originated on a BGP speaking router. 
The IGP ORIGIN type is the most preferred 
ORIGIN for a route during the path selection 
process and is selected before the EGP or 
Incomplete ORIGIN types. 
1 EGP 
The route originated from an EGP (not E-BGP) 
session. The EGP ORIGIN type is more 
preferred than the Incomplete ORIGIN type. 
2 Incomplete 
The route originated from a routing process other 
than BGP, and entered BGP by means of manual 
redistribution, such as redistribution from an IGP 
protocol, static route, or connected route. The 
Incomplete ORIGIN type is not preferred over 
IGP or EGP. 
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2.3.2. BGP Path selection Procedure  
Routing protocols are responsible for selecting a path between two 
communicating nodes. There are multiple protocols to route traffic such as BGP and 
OSPF. These routing protocols use different procedures to select the best path to route 
traffic from source to destination. As explained in [5], BGP uses a best path algorithm 
to select the best path to route traffic. BGP selects a best path by choosing the highest 
weight value of all available paths. If the weight values are the same then the Local-
Preference value is compared and the path with the highest value is selected. If the 
Local-Preference value is the same, the BGP selects the route with the lowest ORIGIN 
value. If all routes have the same ORIGIN value, then BGP selects the shortest AS-Path 
length. If the AS-Path length is the same for all paths, then the BGP selection procedure 
selects the path with the lowest MED value. In the case that all paths have the same 
MED value, the IBGP path is selected over EBGP. If the paths are the same, BGP selects 
the route with the lowest IGP cost which is associated with the nearest neighbor. If they 
are the same, BGP selects the route received from the peer with the lowest BGP router 
ID. 
2.3.3. BGP Threats and Attacks 
There are many studies that have been conducted to investigate the Internet 
resiliency against deliberate and non-deliberate threats and weaknesses. In addition, 
there have been a number of approaches that have been proposed to recover from an 
outage that may happen due to specific types of the Internet outage. In the following we 
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present some of the threats and weaknesses facing the Internet resiliency as well as some 
of the proposed solutions to recover from specific causes of Internet outages.  
The Internet resiliency is highly dependent on the robustness of BGP. There are 
many issues related to BGP’s capability to meet the scale of the growth of the Internet, 
mainly due to security concerns. Barrett et al. [9] discussed some security issues of BGP. 
First, BGP does not provide an authorization mechanism to ensure the ownership of a 
speciﬁc block of addresses that are being advertised by a particular AS. Second, BGP 
does not have any mechanism to make sure the advertising router really has reachability 
to the advertised path.  
Nordstrom and Dovrolis [10] showed that BGP is vulnerable to four different 
threats. First, blocking the traffic for a specific AS or prefix by dropping the traffic that 
reaches the attacked router. The second threat for BGP can happen by sending fake 
updates or advertisements to make the network unstable by advertising unreachable or 
non-existent paths. Supervision is the third threat, where the attacker redirects the traffic 
to the originally intended destination but only after modifying it. The fourth threat is 
achieved when the attacker redirects the traffic to a different destination for inspection 
before resending it to the original destination without any modifications. Such a threat 
is referred to as redirection. Similarly, Hu et al. [11] provided a list of security 
weaknesses of BGP. First, the message integrity and message origin authentication 
mechanisms are not provided by BGP. Second, BGP does not provide a mechanism to 
verify the legality of the AS-Path or the prefix advertisements from the AS. Third, 
attributes in BGP messages are passed on without any validity check.  
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Kim et al. [12] proved that by modifying the Internet infrastructure, a higher 
Internet resiliency can be achieved. Cohen et al. [13] a proved mathematically that the 
Internet could suffer from a momentous outage because of deliberate attacks that attack 
a specific AS that is aggregating a huge number of Internet connections.  This kind of 
attack happens due to the complex and non-structured nature of the Internet architecture. 
Dolev et al. [14] measured and analyzed the Internet resiliency based on ASes 
connectivity as a directed graph. Moreover, they have shown that the Internet is highly 
resistant to non-deliberate attacks, while it is highly affected by deliberate attacks. 
In subsection 2.3.4 we provide a brief description for some of the proposed 
solutions that address the BGP threats. On the other hand, subsection 2.3.5 provides an 
explanation of a BGP feature that enhances the Internet resiliency. 
2.3.4. BGP Security Solutions 
Nordstrom and Dovrolis [8] proposed two types of countermeasures for the BGP 
threats. Filtering is the first approach which requires that ASes first filter all fake 
advertisements and updates. Secure Border Gateway Protocol (S-BGP) is the second 
proposed approach to countermeasure the BGP threats, but on the other hand it will 
create more overheads such as performance overheads and deployment costs. 
Jin and Wang [15] proposed another mechanism which countermeasures BGP 
threats. The proposed mechanism performs better than S-BGP. The mechanism verifies 
all announced prefixes through a verification system referred to as the Assignment 
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Track (AT). The AT requires each AS to verify its address assignment, and accordingly 
the AT certifies that announced prefix by an AS belongs to that AS. 
2.3.5. BGP Multihoming 
BGP multihoming enables a BGP router to connect a site to two or more ASes 
to provide redundant connectivity and increase the Internet resiliency. As explained by 
Liu and Xiao [16], the two main types of multihoming are BGP multihoming and NAT 
multihoming. BGP multihoming is the ability of stub networks to connect to two or 
more public network connections to the Internet using BGP. BGP multihoming 
guarantees the uniqueness of the host IP address. On the other hand, NAT multihoming 
is based on the use of NATing to map a number of public Internet addresses assigned 
by different ISPs to internal local network addresses. Savola [17] has shown the 
functionalities and the restrictions of the IPv6 multihoming such as maintain connection 
survivability when network outage happens and the multihomed site looses physical 
connection to one of the ISPs. Moreover, they provided the main steps to achieve new 
multihoming architecture for IPv6. 
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CHAPTER 3 
IMPLEMENTATION & VALIDATION OF SOLUTIONS 
USING BGP TUNING BASED APPROACH 
3.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, we evaluate the impact of implementating the BGP-Based 
solutions that were proposed by Alrefai [1] to solve the problem of the Internet access 
denial problem caused by malicious ISPs. The evaluation considers applying the 
following methods to an IPv6 network: 
1. Local- Preference: This method relies on the fact that a route with a higher 
local preference is more preferred. The local preference is used to control the outgoing 
traffic by assigning a higher local preference value in the local region gateway router to 
the non-malicious ISP. This will make the non-malicious ISP more preferred and will 
direct the outgoing traffic through the non-malicious ISP.  
2. Community: The community method is used to control the incoming traffic 
by using the BGP community attribute. The BGP community attribute can be set to a 
specific value and combined with a specific prefix before advertising it to other ASes. 
When an AS receives the prefix it will check the community value and if it matches the 
specific community number it triggers the AS to assign  the non-malicious ISP a  higher 
local preference value to make the route through the non-malicious ISP more preferred. 
As a result, the traffic to the local region will go through the non-malicious ISP. 
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3. More Specific Prefix: The routing tables contain address prefixes to be used 
for comparing the destination address of an incoming packet with such address prefix 
address. Since the router uses the longest prefix matching rule, and if the non-malicious 
ISP routing advertises a longer prefix to the local region, then this will make the non-
malicious ISP more preferred to the other routers. Thus, the more specific prefix method 
controls the incoming traffic through advertising more specific prefixes to the local 
region by the non-malicious ISP. As a result, the non-malicious ISP becomes more 
preferred to the other routers when sending the traffic to the local region.   
4. Prepending: AS Path Prepending is a common BGP method to influence path 
selection. Prepending works by adding an AS number to the end of the path one or more 
times. Adding the AS number one or more times makes the AS-Path longer and less 
preferred. When prepending the local region AS and advertising it to the malicious ISP, 
the malicious ISP becomes less preferred to the other routers while the non-malicious 
ISP becomes more preferred to the other routers in sending the traffic to the local region. 
5. AS Path Shortening: BGP prefers the shortest AS path when selecting 
between different paths. Hence, in the shortening method the non-malicious ISP 
advertises the local region prefix without the AS number of the local region. Thus, the 
advertised local region prefix by the non-malicious ISP will be shorter than that 
advertised by the malicious ISP. As a result, the non-malicious ISP becomes more 
preferred by the other routers in directing the traffic to the local region.   
We will refer to the aforementioned methods as BGP tuning methods. In order 
to evaluate the impact of implementing the BGP tuning methods on the network to 
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control outgoing and incoming traffic, OPNET simulations are performed. OPNET is 
the industry's leading network development software.  OPNET provides the ability to 
design and study communication networks, devices, protocols, and applications.  
OPNET’s object-oriented modeling approach and graphical user interface (GUI) enable 
relatively easy means of developing models from the actual world network, hardware 
devices, and protocols. OPNET supports all major network types and technologies, 
allowing the design and testing of various scenarios with reasonable certainty of the 
output results. OPNET version 17.5 PL3 supports most features of the IPv6 and BGP-4 
protocols. OPNET gives the ability to work with EBGP and IBGP connections. 
Moreover, the GUI provides easy way to create BGP policies and change the BGP 
attributes which allows us to simulate the control of the incoming and the outgoing 
traffic. Prepending, use of Community and Local Preference are supported by OPNET. 
On the other hand, OPNET does not support changing the configuration of the 
simulation while it is running. In addition, AS-Path, shortening, more specific prefixes, 
and malicious blocking by an ISP are not supported in OPNET. 
This chapter is organized as follows. The BGP simulation for the baseline 
configuration is presented first. Then, the basic implementation for controlling incoming 
and outgoing traffic is shown. Finally, the code changes that have been made to provide 
real scenarios, to make changes in the middle of the simulation, and to add non-
supported solutions such as AS-Path shortening and more specific prefixes as well as 
the associated simulation are presented. 
21 
3.2. General Methodology 
The OPNET simulations and evaluation of the IPv6 BGP-based solutions are 
done by considering different Internet environment scenarios. Figure 3.1 shows the 
baseline network configuration for our simulation. AS12 is the local region and it 
represents the region of concern. The local region is a multihomed AS with two ISPs. 
The primary ISP is AS3 and it is referred to as the malicious ISP. On the other hand, 
AS4 is the secondary ISP for the local region and it is referred to as the non-malicious 
ISP. Moreover, AS7 includes the client side that request services from AS12 that hosts 
application servers that provide FTP, HTTP and VoIP services. The malicious ISP 
deliberately drops the traffic for the local region while it still advertises the local region 
prefixes on the Internet. In addition, the malicious ISP continues to exchange keep alive 
and BGP messages with the local region speaker router. When the local region detects 
the loss of data exchange with the malicious router then the local region speaker router 
will attempt to force the outgoing traffic and draw the incoming traffic through the non-
malicious ISP.  
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Incoming and outgoing scenarios are tested with the same procedure. The testing 
procedure consists of different traffic configurations that combine a tested network 
application with specific traffic load. With each scenario tested, the performance figures 
of convergence time, throughput, end-to-end delay and packet loss are collected when 
switching from the malicious ISP to the non-malicious ISP. The results obtained through 
this simulation for IPv6 are compared against the results obtained for IPv4 and that are 
reported by Alrefai [1]. 
3.3. BGP-Based Solutions 
The BGP-based solutions to be tested are those used by Alrefai [1]. More 
specifically, the following are the tested solutions: Local-Preference, AS-Path 
Shortening, More Specific Prefix, use of  Community, and Prepending. 
Figure 3. 1 Base Simulation Scenario. 
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3.4. Baseline Simulation Configuration  
In this study, we have to test different types of solutions such as solutions 
supported directly by OPNET, and solutions provided through code modifications. In 
each case, we try to control incoming and outgoing IPv6 traffic. The network setup used 
in this study has the same structure and components as the network setup used by Alrefai 
[1], and is shown in Figure 3.2. 
3.5. Devices Used 
ethernet4_slip8_gtwy router: is an IP-based gateway router that  supports four 
Ethernet hub interfaces and eight serial line interfaces. The IP packets are routed based 
Figure 3. 2 Baseline Network Configuration. 
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on the destination IP address at any interface. A gateway router supports almost all 
protocols such as IP, UDP, TCP, BGP, Ethernet, and other protocols.[4] 
As shown in Figure 3.2, we have 7 routers, all of them are configured with IPv6 
and BGP protocols. IBGP protocol is configured inside each autonomous system routers 
and EBGP is configured between different autonomous systems.  
100BaseT_LAN object models: used to simulate Ethernet LANs running over 
100BASE-X,100BASE-T, and 10BASE-T. Each model simulates the operations of a 
LAN with a number of end nodes. Moreover, this model can be configured with 
different configurations such as applications, switching speed and the number of 
workstations. [4] 
In our simulation, we assume that LAN_West that is connected to AS12 
communicates with LAN_East that is connected to AS7. LAN_West provides different 
types of services such as HTTP, FTP, and VoIP to LAN_East. 
ip32_cloud node: models an IP cloud and is commonly used to represent the 
connectivity to the Internet. This model has 32 serial IP interfaces. This node is used to 
simulate the delay of the Internet by configuring ‘Packet Latency’ attributes and ‘Packet 
Discard Ratio’ used to specify the percentage of traffic to be discarded.  Through this 
node we can observe the effect of Internet delay on the convergence time of the different 
solutions. In the base_line scenario, the delay will be 1 ms, whereas for the solutions 
scenarios we test different delay values.  
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Bidirectional PPP_DS3 link: a link that has a data rate of 44.736 Mbps and is 
used to connect nodes that run the IP protocol using ip3_dgram packet format [4]. In 
our simulation, this type of link is used to connect routers with each other. 
Bidirectional 100BaseT link: is a link that works at 100Mbps and has a 
“Propagation Speed” attributes that can be configured. In our network we use this link 
to connect LANs to their routers. 
3.6. Controlling Traffic Using Supported OPNET features 
Using the routing policy in OPNET allows the control of the outgoing traffic 
from the local ISP and the incoming traffic to the local ISP. Note that the local ISP is 
multihomed to malicious and non-malicious ISPs. The outgoing traffic is controlled 
using two methods. First, by using the Local-Preference property which is supported by 
OPNET. Second, by modifying the AS-Path through prepending to make the routes 
through a specific route less preferred. OPNET supports the use of community that 
allows ASes to prefer routes with a certain community number. In this section, we will 
use the supported configurations by OPNET to control the incoming and outgoing 
traffic. No malicious router will be configured for this section. 
3.6.1.  Baseline Simulation 
In our simulation, we assume that LAN_West that is connected to AS12 
responds to HTTP, FTP, and VoIP requests from  LAN_East that is connected to AS7. 
AS12 consists of Router1 and Router2, and represents the local ISP, LAN_West is the 
network that the malicious router, Router3, is targeting for blocking. Router2 is a 
speaker router for the local region that is connected to Router3 and Router4 that belong 
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to the malicious ISP and non-malicious ISP, respectively. Since Router3 is the malicious 
ISP, it will be configured to block incoming/outgoing traffic to the local ISP.  
The main traffic we are looking for is the IPv6 traffic between Router2 and 
Router3 and between Router2 and Router4 in both directions as shown in Figure 3.3. 
In Figure 3.3, time, measured in seconds, is shown in the x-axis, while the y-
axis represents the throughput in packets/second. As shown in Figure 3.3, both data 
traffic and BGP traffic are exchanged between Router2 and Router3, whereas only BGP 
traffic is exchanged between Router2 and Router4.  
Figure 3. 3 Incoming and Outgoing Traffic in Baseline Simulation. 
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Figure 3.4 shows the IP forwarding table for Router2. The IP address of 
LAN_East is 2005:0:0:B:0:0:0:1 so it belongs to the prefix 2005:0:0:B/64. It can be seen 
from Figure 3.4 that Router3 is the ‘Next Hop Node’ for the LAN_East prefix since 
Router3 is the primary ISP for the local region.  
Figure 3. 4 IP Forwarding Table for Router2. 
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Similarly, Figure 3.5 shows the IP forwarding table of Router5. The IP address 
of LAN_West is 2005:0:0:8:0:0:0:2, so it belongs to the prefix 2005:0:0:8/64. It can be 
seen from Figure 3.5 that Router3 is the ‘Next Hop Node’ for the LAN_West prefix. 
Figure 3. 6 Convergence activity and duration of baseline Simulation  
Figure 3. 5 IP forwarding table of Router5.  
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Figure 3.6 shows the BGP convergence activity and duration of the baseline 
simulation scenario. The Figure shows that there are two convergence activities 
represented as two points in the figure. The first convergence activity happens because 
of the start of the BGP which takes about 0.052 seconds. The second activity takes about 
0.010 seconds. The routing updates are sent as soon as the BGP routing table changes. 
There are 30 seconds between the two activities and this delay happened because of 
minimum route advertisement interval (MRAI). The MRAI round is the minimum time 
interval between sending two consecutive update messages for the same destination. 
The BGP convergence time is affected by the duration of MRAI and the implementation 
of MRAI timers. The default MRAI value (30 s) is used in the majority of today’s routers 
and in our simulation. 
3.6.2.  Outgoing Traffic Control Simulation 
To control the outgoing traffic, a high Local-Preference value for the preferred 
AS was set in Router2 of the simulation. The Local-Preference is one of the BGP 
attributes that plays a major role in the BGP selection process. Moreover, there is a 
default Local-Preference value for each neighbor. By applying a policy that assigns 
higher Local-Preference value for the non-malicious ISP, then all routes learned from 
the non-malicious ISP will have higher local preference and will be selected as best 
route. In our simulation we configure a policy in Router2 that gives higher Local-
Preference for Router4 to be selected as the best route. Figure 3.7 shows the outgoing 
traffic from Router 2 to Router3 and from Router2 to Router4. 
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As Router2 has a higher Local-Preference value set for Router4, we can observe 
from Figure 3.7 that Router2 traffic is directed to pass through Router4. To check this 
further, the BGP routing table of Router2 in Figure 3.8 shows that Router4 is the ‘Next 
Hop Node’ for the destination LAN_East prefix.   
Figure 3. 8 Forwarding Table of Router 2 After Applying Local-Preference Policy. from Router2.  
Figure 3. 7 IP Outgoing traffic 
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Figure 3.9 shows that the convergence activity and duration when a higher 
Local- Preference value is set in the simulation is similar to that found for the baseline 
experiment. 
3.6.3.  Incoming Traffic Control Simulations 
In this section we present how to control the incoming traffic using prepending 
and community which are supported by OPNET. 
3.6.3.1. Use of Prepending  
Prepending is the action of adding your own AS number to the end of the path 
one or more times, and announcing the prepended path to external BGP peers. 
Prepending an AS path makes a shorter AS path look longer and therefore less 
preferable to BGP. The neighbor that receives prepended update messages will also 
announce the long AS-path and this makes it less preferable for the incoming traffic. 
We prepended the advertisement that was sent to the malicious ISP (Router3) and that 
Figure 3. 9 Convergence activity of Local-Preference Policy Scenario. 
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makes it less preferable while sending normal advertisements to the non-malicious ISP 
(Router4). Figure 3.10 shows that traffic is incoming to Router2 from Router4 since the 
routing policy is configured to prepend the AS-Path with AS12 when sending the 
advertisements to the malicious ISP (Router3). 
Figure 3. 10 Incoming traffic to Router2 of prepending scenario. 
As shown in Figure 3.11, the prepending is achieved by sending BGP update 
messages from Router2 to Router3 that has the AS 12 prepended. As a result of the BGP 
update message, Router3 will be forced to reconfigure its BGP routing table to increase 
the route length between Router 2 and Router3 to 2. On the other hand, the path length 
is kept at 1 in the BGP routing table of Router5. This makes Router4 more preferred for 
Router5 over Router3 as shown in Figure 3.11. 
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As shown in Figure 3.12, Router5 selected Router4 as the “Next Hop Node” to 
the prefix 2005:0:0:8:0:0:0:0 because it has a shorter AS‐Path [4 12] through Router4 
than through Router3 which has the AS‐Path [3 12 12]. 
Figure 3. 11 BGP routing table of Router3 in Prepend scenario. 
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Figure 3.13 shows the convergence activity for the network. The behavior is 
similar to that of the baseline experiment. 
   
Figure 3. 13 Convergence activity of Prepending policy Scenario. 
Figure 3. 12 BGP routing table of Router5 in Prepend scenario 
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3.6.3.2. Use of Community 
The second approach of controlling incoming traffic using OPNET supported 
properties is use of community. The community is a BGP numeric attribute that can be 
assigned to a specific prefix and advertised to other neighbors. When the neighbor 
receives the prefix it will examine the community value and take proper action whether 
it is filtering or modifying other attributes. The use of community attributes requires 
agreement between ASes that will use it. 
In our experiment we need to control the traffic that comes from Router5 to go 
through Router4. The agreement between our local ISP Router2 and Router5 is to assign 
a higher local preference for the route that announces an advertisement with a specific 
community number. Accordingly, Router2 is configured using a route map to assign all 
advertised routes from Router2 with community number 12:144 (12 the AS number and 
150 is our community number) and then applies this route map for every route 
advertised to Router4. On the other hand, Router5 will examine all the received routes 
and when any route comes with the same community number it gives that route a higher 
local preference. As shown in Figure 3.14 the throughput of incoming traffic to Router2 
from Router3 and from Router4. 
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After applying the community approach, Figure 3.14 shows more traffic flowing 
between Router2 and Router4 than between Router2 and Router3. Thus, Router2 prefers 
Router4 over  Router3 when exchanging traffic with LAN_East. To see how the 
community approach works, Figure 3.15 shows the BGP routing table of Router5. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 14 Incoming Traffic to Router2 Using Community. 
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It can be seen that all the routes whose community list contains 12:144 have 
their local preference set to 150. For example, the prefix 2005:0::0:8.0/64 whose 
community list is set to [12:144], has a local preference set to 150 by Router5. A route 
map is defined in Router5 as the following: if the route has the community number 
12:144 in its community list, then it assigns the value 150 to its local preference. As a 
result, the route through Router4 is preferred. 
Figure 3.16 shows the convergence activity in this network which depicts similar 
behavior to the baseline experiment. 
Figure 3. 15 BGP Routing Table of Router5 in the Community Experiment. 
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3.7. Modification of OPNET Implementation 
In the previous approaches we notice that the solutions are applied from the 
beginning of the simulation. However, we need to change the configuration during the 
simulation run, but unfortunately OPNET supports limited changes such as failing a 
node or a link in a specified time. The changes in the configuration that are needed 
during the simulation run include starting a malicious blocking or applying solutions at 
specific times. Such changes are not supported by OPNET.  
In this section we explain the state model in OPNET and the modifications 
needed to add the missing features in OPNET that support our experiments. First, we 
discuss the modifications done to OPNET to add malicious blocking. Then, we explain 
modifications to the BGP protocol for reconfiguration at a specific time. After that, we 
give an overview of the BGP process model in OPNET. Finally, we discuss how the 
Figure 3. 16 Convergence Activity and Duration of Community Experiment. 
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shortening and more specific prefix approaches are to be implemented in OPNET. In all 
approaches where experiments have been conducted, we use the same network setup 
used in the baseline scenario that is shown in Figure 3.2. 
3.7.1. OPNET Process Model  
A process model controls the underlying functionality of the node models. The 
process models are represented by finite state machines (FSMs) and are created with 
icons that represent states and lines that represent transitions between states. Operations 
performed in each state or for a transition are described in embedded C or C++ code 
blocks. 
The states can be forced or unforced (Blocking). The forced states are 
represented by red color and unforced by the green color. The unforced state is also 
called idle state. That means it returns control to the simulation kernel after executing 
its executives. When the simulation starts, the FSM will execute the idle state and will 
then be ready to transition with the first arriving packet. On the other hand, the forced 
state does not return control to the simulation kernel, but instead immediately executes 
the exit executives and transitions to another state.  
3.7.2.  Building A malicious Router  
In this section, we discuss in brief the IP protocol in OPNET. After that, a brief 
description of the required modifications to the IP protocol to support the evaluated 
solutions is given. Then, we go through the required modification of OPNET to build 
the malicious router. 
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3.7.2.1. Summary of IP Implementation  
Each node in OPENT which uses IP has an IP routing module, which contains a 
dispatcher process that spawns the various routing processes. The ip_dispatch process 
implements IP routing functions, and fragmentation and reassembly. The ip_dispatch 
process requires a fixed amount of time to route each packet. Packets are forwarded on 
a first-come, first-served basis. Figure 3.17 shows the ip_dispatch process model. In our 
modification we are working with ip_rte_central_cpu process which is a child process 
of the ip_dispatch process. The ip_rte_central_cpu is responsible for routing all packets 
from all interfaces in the router. In our modification we are only considering IPv6 packet 
format. 
 
Figure 3. 17 IP_Dispatch Process Model [5]. 
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Figure 3.18 shows the states of the ip_rte_central_cpu process model. The 
ip_rte_central_cpu_packet_arrival() is called when a packet arrives. In the case the 
processing rate was not infinite, the three forced states added to the right of the blocking 
state ‘ip_central_cpu’ add a delay. 
3.7.2.2. Malicious Router Implementation 
A malicious router acts as a normal router with the exception that it drops the 
traffic destined to or originating from a specific prefix. In addition, the malicious router 
continues to advertise to other ASes that it has a route to the blocked prefixes. In order 
to implement a malicious router a modification to the IP routing module is needed. 
Moreover, we need to provide an interface for the malicious router to set the blocking 
prefixes and the time to start the malicious activity. 
3.7.2.3. Exact Modifications of the IP Model 
The required interface that enables the user to configure the malicious router is 
added to the bgp_dispatch process and is shown in Figure 3.19. Through this interface 
Figure 3. 18 ip_rte_central_cpu Process Model [5]. 
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the user is able to set the time when the blocking should start and the prefix to be 
blocked. The blocking process starts by investigating each incoming packet using the 
ip_rte_central_cpu_packet_arrival() method which in turn calls upon the 
ip_rte_blackhole_traffic() that was added by Alrefai [1]. Subsequently, we modified the 
ip_rte_blackhole_traffic() to account for IPv6 traffic. The newly modified method 
examines each packet against the blocked prefix. Thus, the 
ip_rte_central_cpu_packet_arrival() method calls upon the modified 
ip_rte_blackhole_traffic() method for each incoming packet and decides if this packet 
belongs to the blocked prefix or not. Refer to [1] to see the activity diagram of the 
blackholing method. Figure 3.19 shows the malicious router configuration used in the 
simulation. Accordingly, the malicious activity will start at time 300 and 2008:0:0:8::0 
is the blackholed prefix.  
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Figure 3.20 shows the throughput between Router2 and Router3, the throughput 
between Router2 and Router 4, and the dropped traffic of Router3. 
The two topmost plots of Figure 3.20 indicate that traffic is being exchanged 
between Router2 and Router3 for the first 300 seconds. Subsequently, the traffic 
exchange ceases between Router2 and Router3 because the malicious activity is 
configured to start at time 300. Moreover, we notice from the last plot in Figure 3.20 
the increased packet dropped in Router3. Note that the traffic exchanged between 
Router2 and Router3 is HTTP traffic which runs on top of TCP. Subsequently, the 
difference between the number of packets sent and the number of packets dropped, as 
seen in Figure 3.20 is due to the congestion control feature of TCP. 
Figure 3. 19 Interface to Configure Malicious Router. 
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To see that the malicious router is still advertising a path to the local region, 
Figure 3.21 shows the BGP table of Router5. Figure 3.21 shows that Router3 is the 
“Next Hop Node” of prefix 2005:0:0:8::0/64 and through the AS‐Path [3 12] for 
Router5.  
Figure 3.20 Throughput in A malicious Configuration Experiment.3.21   
Figure 3.21 BGP table of Router 5 in Malicious Experiment.  3.201  
. 
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3.8. Building Countermeasures Against a Malicious Act  
In this section we discuss the BGP tuning approaches tested in specific time in 
the simulation after the malicious router has started blackholing the traffic.  
First there is a brief introduction to the OPNET BGP module. Then, we will 
discuss the required modification and added methods for OPNET to control the outgoing 
traffic. Finally, we will discuss the required modification and added methods for 
OPNET to control the incoming traffic. 
3.8.1. Summary of BGP in OPNET  
OPNET models BGP with two processes, the bgp process and bgp_conn 
process. Figure 3.22 shows the state diagram of the bgp process. The ‘bgp’ process is 
the root process that controls the BGP peering sessions established with neighbors. The 
process initiates peering connections to all configured neighbors at the specified start 
time and dispatches any messages from neighbors to the correct bgp_conn process. 
When a BGP message arrives, it also invokes the corresponding child process. A child 
process is an instance of the bgp_conn process model shown in Figure 3.23. 
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The bgp_conn process model represents the BGP finite state machine. Each BGP 
peer router communicates with a bgp_conn process which is created for each bgp peer 
the router communicates with. Initiating, maintaining, and tearing down the BGP and 
TCP connection processes are the functions that the child process is responsible for.  
Figure 3. 23 BGP Con Process [5]. 
Figure 3. 22 BGP Process [5].. 
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3.8.2. BGP Modification for Scheduling Reconfiguration  
Each BGP tuning approach has an interface to ease the reconfiguration for the 
users. Using those interfaces, users could set the time which triggers the reconfiguration 
for the specific simulated approach. All the reconfiguration requests are saved in a list 
and at the user specified time those requests will be triggered.   
The reconfiguration process is started by reading the time and the 
reconfiguration request information. Then, a RECONFIGURE event occurs at the time 
specified in the reconfiguration information. After the RECONFIGURE event is 
triggered, the direction of the reconfiguration process is determined to reflect whether a 
reconfiguration of incoming routes or outgoing routes is needed. Finally, the appropriate 
child process is called to handle the reconfiguration process.   
Figure 3. 24 Modified BGP Process Model [1]. 
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Figure 3.24 shows the modified process model of BGP. As described in the 
reconfiguration process earlier, it shows states in active mode because they will be 
trigger when the event occurs. The reconfiguration state is used to determine the 
direction of the update as either ‘in’ (incoming updates) or ‘out’ (outgoing updates) so 
as to triggered the appropriate states reconfigureIn and reconfigureOut.  
3.8.2.1. Modification to Control The Outgoing Traffic  
Although OPNET supports the concept of Local-Preference, however OPNET 
does not support changes of the configuration in the middle of the simulation. 
Subsequently, Alrefai [1] has added this feature by modifying the OPNET code. In our 
work we modified Alrefai’s work to account for IPv6 traffic. Accordingly, Local-
Preference is used in order to control the outgoing traffic by assigning a higher Local-
Prefernce value to desired routes. 
Figure 3. 25 Specification of Time When Applying Route Map. 
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The simulation scenario is configured to use a malicious router starting at 300, 
and the local preference route map policy is triggered at 350. Figure 3.25 shows the 
added interface that enables the user to set the time to trigger the route map.  
Figure 3.26 shows the incoming and outgoing traffic between Router2 and 
Router3, between Router2 and Router4, and dropped traffic at Router3. 
Figure 3. 26 Throughput Traffic After Applying Local-Preference  in the Presence of A malicious 
Router. 
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As seen in Figure 3.26, it is clear that applying a higher Local-Preference to the 
route does not show that the outgoing traffic is passing through Router4. To make sure that 
a change has occurred, we can examine the IP forwarding table of Router2 in Figure 3.27.  
It is clear that at time 350, the prefix to 2005:0:0:B::0/64 is inserted in the table and 
it has Router4 as the “Next Hop Node”. This route entry was initially through Router3. To 
see this, Figure 3.27 shows the IP forwarding table for Router2 at time 200. 
Figure 3.28 shows that the ‘Next Hop Node’ for the prefix 2005:0:0:B::0/64 
before Router3 becomes malicious is Router3 with the local preference value set to 20.  
Figure 3. 27 Forwarding Table of Router2 in Local-Preference and Malicious Experiment. 
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Figure 3.29 shows the BGP routing table at time 2000. As shown, Router4 is the 
next hop to LAN_East. However, we observe from Figure 3.26 that there is no outgoing 
traffic after Router3 becomes malicious and this is because of the application type used. 
LAN_East works as an HTTP client that requests services from the HTTP servers hosted 
at the LAN_West. The HTTP request is sent from LAN_East to LAN_West and 
LAN_West will send a reply through Router3. However, after Router3 becomes 
malicious, the subsequent requests will not reach LAN_West because of the malicious 
activity and the Local-Preference has no effect on the incoming traffic.  
Figure 3. 28 IP Forwarding Table of Router2 at Time 200 in the Local-Preference and Malicious 
Experiment. 
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3.8.2.2. Control of Incoming Traffic: The Use of Community 
The use of the community is one of the possible solutions that can be applied to 
control the incoming traffic that is supported by OPNET when dealing with a malicious 
ISP. On the other hand, OPNET does not support the configuration of community at a 
specific time. So, Alrefai [1] modified OPNET to use the community while the 
simulation is running. Subsequently, we modified Alrefai’s work to consider IPv6 
traffic.  
When using the community scenario to control the incoming traffic, we 
configure Router2 to send community number 12:144 to Router4 at time 350 time. 
Subsequently, Router4 will advertise this community number to Router5 which will 
assign higher local preference to routes with that community number, and forces the 
traffic to go through the non-malicious ISP. Figure 3.30 shows the throughput between 
Figure 3. 29 Routing Table of Router2 in Local-Preference and Malicious Experiment 
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Router2 and Router3, and between Router2 and Router4 in both directions. In addition, 
the figure shows the packets dropped due to the malicious act of Router3 that started at 
time 300. 
 
Figure 3.30 shows that the traffic between Router2 and Router3 ceases after 
Router3 became malicious. After applying the solution, the traffic is exchanged between 
Router2 and Router4. The bottom part of Figure 3.30 shows the dropped traffic in 
Router3 which happens after Router3 became malicious and before applying the 
solution.  
 
Figure 3. 30 Throughput between Router2 and Router3, Router4 and Packet drop of Router3. 
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Figure 3.31 shows the BGP routing table of Router5 at the end of the simulation. 
The Router5 routing table in Figure 3.31 shows the advertised community [12:144] that 
was sent by Router2 is associated with 2005:0:0:8::0/64. Accordingly, Router4 is set as 
the ‘Next Hop Node’ for prefix 2005:0:0:8::0/64 with a Local-Preference set to 150. 
On the other hand, as shown in Figure 3.32, Router5 routing table at time 
71seconds does not show any community number and the ‘Next Hop Node’ to the prefix 
2005:0:0:8::0/64  is Router3 since the solution has not been applied yet. 
Figure 3. 31 BGP Routing table of Router5 in Malicious and Community Experiment. 
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Figure 3.33 shows the convergence activity and duration of the community and 
approval. The network takes about 0.026 seconds to converge after the use of 
community is applied and is represented as a third point in Figure 3.33. 
3.8.2.3. AS-Path Shortening  
Shortening is one of the approaches that can be used to bypass the Internet access 
denial problem that OPNET did not support. Implementing shortening in OPNET was 
introduced by Alrefai [1].  
Figure 3.33 Convergence Activity in Community and Malicious. 3.32  
Figure 3.32 BGP Routing table of Router5 in Malicious and Community Experiment at Time 71 
Seconds. 3.33. 
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The shortening approach requires an agreement between two routers (Regional 
and non-malicious ISP). Shortening the route means that the ISP advertises the route to 
the regional AS with an AS-Path that contains only the AS number of  the ISP while 
eliminating the AS number of the regional AS. Hence, the shortening approach works 
by sending update messages from the regional router to the non-malicious ISP, then the 
ISP will shorten that route. As a result, the advertised route from the non-malicious ISP 
will be shorter by one and it will be more preferred than the route received from the 
malicious ISP. In the shortening scenario, we use shortening and local preference 
together at time 350 to control the incoming and outgoing traffic whereas the malicious 
activity starts at time 300.  
Figure 3.34 shows the throughput between Router2 and Router3, and between 
Router2 and Router4 in both directions in addition to the traffic dropped at Router3. 
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Figure 3.34 shows the incoming and outgoing traffic passing through Router4 
after applying the solution while there is a small amount of the dropped packets during 
the period from the start of the malicious activity until the start of the solution. 
Moreover, Figure 3.35 shows the Router5 BGP routing table at the end of the simulation. 
Figure 3. 34 Throughput Between Router2 and Routers3 and Router4 and Dropped Traffic of 
Router3. 
Figure 3. 35 BGP Routing Table of Router5 in Shortening, Local-Pref, Malicious Experiment. 
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Figure 3.35 shows that Router5 prefers Router4 for prefix 2005:0:0:8::0/64 
because it has the shortest AS-Path length. Furthermore, Figure 3.36 shows the routing 
table of Router5 at time 71 before applying the malicious activity and the shortening 
solution. The figure shows that for the same prefix, Router3 was chosen as the next hop 
which results in an AS-Path length of 2.  
Figure 3.37 shows the convergence activity of the shortening scenario. We 
notice that a third point is added which shows the change that happened in the middle 
of the simulation at time 350 when the shortening solution was applied. It takes about 
0.021 seconds for the shortening solution to converge. 
Figure 3. 36 BGP Routing Table of Router5 in As- Path Shortening and Local-Preference, Malicious Experiment. 
Figure 3. 37 Convergence activity and duration for shortening experiment. 
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3.8.2.4. More Specific Prefixes 
 OPNET gives the user the ability to send prefixes which are not in the routing table. 
On the other hand, it sends these prefixes to all neighbors. A more specific prefix approach 
works by sending the more specific prefixes to a specific neighbor. Accordingly, we 
modified the more specific approach that was implemented by Alrefai [1] to account for  
IPv6 prefixes and traffic. 
Figure 3.38 shows the incoming and outgoing traffic passing through Router4 
after applying the solution. Furthermore, the figure shows that there is a small amount 
of dropped packets during the period between the start of the malicious activity and the 
start of the solution.  
As shown in Figure 3.39, the newly added prefixes are 2005:0:0:8::2/128 and 
2005:0:0:8::128/128.  Moreover, the default prefix 2005:0:0:8::0/64 still exists in the 
Figure 3. 38 Incoming and Outgoing Traffic of Router2 in More Specific , Local Preference, 
Malicious Experiment. 
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table. Since BGP uses longest prefix matching, those newly added prefixes will be more 
preferred and the incoming traffic will pass through Router4.  
Figure 3.40 shows the convergence activity of the more specific prefixes 
scenario. The third point in Figure 3.40 represents the convergence of the network for 
the more specific prefixes solution. It takes about 0.020 seconds for the network to 
converge. 
 
Figure 3. 39 Routing table for Router5 in More Specific Experiment. 
Figure 3. 40 Convergence Activity and Duration of More Specific, Local Preference, and  
Malicious Experiment. 
61 
CHAPTER 4 
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF BGP TUNING 
TECHNIQUES TO CIRCUMVENT MALICIOUS ACT 
4.1. Introduction  
In this chapter, we discuss and illustrate the performance evaluation of the BGP-
based solutions that were proposed by Alrefai [1]. We have simulated the BGP-based 
solutions with different configurations such as background traffic loads, Internet delay 
and traffic types. Figure 4.1 shows the network topology that is used in the performance 
evaluation which is the same topology used in the implementation and validation 
chapter.  
Figure 4.1 Evaluation Network Setup. 
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Similar to the work done by AlRefai [1], the data rate of the link connecting the 
routers have been reduced from 44.736 Mbps to 1.544 Mbps. The reason behind the 
reduction in the data rate is to allow for the study of the effect of the network load within 
a reasonable simulation time. IP_cloud is used to model the Internet delay which follows 
an exponential distribution with a mean of either 0.1 seconds or 5 seconds.  Both links 
from the IP cloud to Router6 and Router7 that are shown in Figure 4.2 are loaded at 
20%, 50%, and 80%. The simulations use three types of traffic types; Hyper Text 
Transfer Protocol (HTTP), File Transfer Protocol (FTP), and Voice over Internet 
Protocol (VoIP). 
In this chapter we are looking at different outcomes. The first outcome is the 
convergence time of BGP protocol for the different solutions in the whole network. The 
Figure 4.2 Network Showing the Links That will be Loaded With Traffic. 
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second outcome is the percentage of packet drop to the total number of application 
packets. The third outcome is the throughput in the link between Router2 and Router3 
and the link between Router2 and Router4 in both directions. Also, we are looking for 
the application traffic sent from and received by LAN_East as well as the response time 
for an HTTP page and an FTP download. Each simulation runs for 2000 seconds during 
which the blackholing starts at 300 seconds, and the solution is applied at time 350. The 
HTTP and FTP simulations run for 20 times. While, the VoIP simulation is run for only 
5 times due to the long time it takes to run the simulation. The mean and the confidence 
interval are displayed in some figures while in some figures we display only the mean.sa 
as to keep the figures legible. The VoIP experiments of the link load of 50% and 80% 
with an Internet delay of 5 seconds are not included due to several problems encountered 
in the simulation .as it will be explained in section 4.4.  
4.2. Simulation Results and Analysis  
This section is divided into three subsections. The first subsection shows the 
percentage of traffic drop results. The second subsection illustrates the convergence 
time results. The third subsection illustrates the performance figures of the throughput 
results. 
4.2.1.  Percentage of traffic drop 
Figure 4.3 shows the dropped packets percentage for each simulation. The x-
axis presents the different simulations configurations in terms of application type, the 
mean of the exponentially distributed delay of the Internet, and the link load. On the 
other hand, the y-axis shows the percentage of packet drop. The vertical bars in Figure 
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4.3 are the confidence intervals of the readings with 95% confidence interval.  
 
Figure 4.3 Packet Drop Percentages. 
It is clear from Figure 4.3 that the FTP and the HTTP applications have lower 
dropped packets percentage than the VoIP application. On the other hand, the VoIP 
application with a 0.1 second Internet delay has the highest dropped packets percentage 
and it is about 5 times larger than the dropped packets percentage of HTTP and FTP. 
The reason for the high dropped packets percentage in VoIP is related to the nature of 
the VoIP traffic as it is a real time application which runs over UDP with a traffic rate 
that remains the same even during the blackholing period. The percentage of packet 
drop in HTTP is about double the percentage of packet drop in FTP application when 
0.1 second Internet delay is used while the HTTP packet drop is slightly higher than that 
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of FTP when 5 seconds Internet delay is used. The difference in dropped packet 
percentage between HTTP and FTP is due to the protocol behavior of each protocol. 
And how each protocol is configured for further explanation can be found in Alrefai [1]. 
Moreover, the packet drop for both HTTP and FTP with Internet delay of 5 seconds is 
three times larger than for the case of 0.1 second Internet delay due to increasing the 
delay of the Internet. Figure 4.3 clearly shows that there is no significant effect of using 
different loads in the percentage of packet drop when the Internet delay is 0.1 second. 
However, some results show little increase in packet drop with different load, such as 
for HTTP application, when the delay of the Internet is 5 seconds. As for the confidence 
interval, Figure 43 shows that as the Internet delay increase the confidence interval 
increases due to the increased amount of randomness of the delay that the packets will 
experience. 
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4.2.2. Convergence Time 
Figure 4.4 shows the convergence time for the 0.1 seconds Internet delay as a 
mean delay of each of the BGP-based solutions with different traffic loads. 
The y-axis represents the convergence time in seconds and the x-axis displays 
the experiment with different traffic loads. As shown in Figure 4.4, the effect of the 
traffic load on the convergence time is very small. In general, the More Specific Prefix 
approach has the lowest convergence time even with the different traffic loads. This is 
because the approach needs to advertise less prefixes than in the shortening and the 
community approaches.  
 
Figure 4.4 BGP Convergence Time for 0.1 Delay of Internet. 
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As shown in Figure 4.4 there is not much effect of loading the two links have on the 
convergence time. However, VoIP has higher convergence time when compared to HTTP 
and FTP. The increase in the convergence time in VoIP happens due to the high traffic 
demand which causes a delay in delivering BGP messages. On the other hand, HTTP has a 
slight increase in convergence time when compared against FTP because of the higher 
number of packets sent by HTTP as a result of having a shorter interarrival time than for 
FTP.  
Figure 4.5, shows the convergence time for the 5 seconds Internet delay as a 
mean delay of each of the BGP-based solutions with different traffic loads. The y-axis 
represents the convergence time in seconds and the x-axis displays the experiment with 
different traffic loads. The effect of increasing the Internet delay on convergence is clear 
when compared to the convergence time for the 0.1 seconds delay of the Internet.  
Figure 4.5 BGP convergence time for 5 second delay. 
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Figure 4.5 shows that the More Specific Prefix approach has the lowest 
convergence time even with the different traffic loads. VoIP has higher convergence 
time when compared to HTTP and FTP. The increase in the convergence time in VoIP 
happens due to the high traffic demand which causes some delay in delivering the BGP 
messages. The loading of the two links has no significant effect on the convergence time 
in general while in the case of FTP the higher the link-load the higher the convergence 
time.  
4.2.3. Throughput  
In this section, we discuss the throughput, measured in bits per second, in both 
directions of the links connecting the local router to the malicious and the non-malicious 
routers. The throughput between Router2 and Router3 shows the effect of blackholing. 
Moreover, the throughput between Router2 and Router3 shows the effect of using 
different solutions. In the following figures the mean throughput of multiple runs is 
shown. Note that the baseline simulation results when there is no malicious activity is 
provided in Appendix B.  
Figure 4.6 shows the throughput, in bits per second, for HTTP traffic from 
Router2 to Router3.  
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Figure 4.7 shows the throughput, in bits per second, for FTP traffic from Router2 
to Router3. Note that the large throughput that is observed around 80 second is mostly 
due to the number of TCP connections of that FTP establish at the beginning of the FTP 
session. 
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Figure 4.6 Outgoing Throughput From Router2 to Router3 for HTTP. 
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Figure 4.8 shows the throughput, in bits per second, for VoIP traffic from 
Router2 to Router3.  
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Figure 4.7 Throughput From Router2 to Router3 for FTP Application. 
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As shown in Figure 4.6, 4.7, and Figure 4.8, for each of the three applications 
all solutions result in almost the same throughput in terms of different link loads. On the 
other hand, for each application all solutions produce different throughput for different 
Internet delays. The increase of the Internet delay causes a decrease in the throughput. 
The reason behind such a decrease is attributed to the fact that an increase in the Internet 
delay triggers the TCP congestion control which causes a decrease in the transmission 
rate. On the other hand, the VoIP throughput is less impact by the Internet delay because 
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Figure 4.8 Throughput From Router2 to Router3 for VoIP Application. 
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VoIP is a real time protocol that operate on top of the UDP protocol which has no 
congestion control.   
In addition, we notice from Figures 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8 we can notice that HTTP  
has the lowest throughput and this mainly due to the HTTP configuration set in the 
simulation where the average page size that the clients request from the server is 7250 
bytes while the size of the file that FTP download, for example, is 50000 bytes.  
The following figures show the throughput for different applications from 
Router3 to Route2. Figure 4.9 shows the throughput, in bits per second, for HTTP traffic 
from Router3 to Router2. 
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Figure 4.9 Incoming Throughput to Router2 from Router3 for HTTP Application. 
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Figure 4.10 shows the throughput, in bits per second, for FTP traffic from 
Router3 to Router2. From Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10 it can be noticed that the higher 
throughput takes place when the Internet delay is less.  
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
0
8
0
1
6
0
2
4
0
3
2
0
4
0
0
4
8
0
5
6
0
6
4
0
7
2
0
8
0
0
8
8
0
9
6
0
1
0
4
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
0
0
1
2
8
0
1
3
6
0
1
4
4
0
1
5
2
0
1
6
0
0
1
6
8
0
1
7
6
0
1
8
4
0
1
9
2
0
2
0
0
0
b
it
s/
se
co
n
d
Throughput 3->2, FTP, Time Average
Shorten, FTP, 5, 50% Shorten, FTP, 0.1, 20% MoreSpec, FTP, 0.1, 20%
Community, FTP, 0.1, 20% Shorten, FTP, 0.1, 50% MoreSpec, FTP, 0.1, 50%
Community, FTP, 0.1, 50% Shorten, FTP, 0.1, 80% MoreSpec, FTP, 0.1, 80%
Community, FTP, 0.1, 80% Shorten, FTP, 5, 20% MoreSpec, FTP,5, 20%
Community, FTP, 5, 20% Shorten, FTP, 5, 50% MoreSpec, FTP, 5, 50%
Community, FTP, 5, 50% Shorten, FTP, 5, 80% MoreSpec, FTP, 5, 80%
Figure 4.10 Throughput from Router2 to Router3 in FTP Application. 
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Figure 4.11 shows the throughput, in bits per second, for VoIP traffic from 
Router3 to Router2. From the figure it can be noticed that the higher throughput takes 
place when the Internet delay is less. As shown in 4.9, 4.10, and 4.11 figures that the 
load has no impact on VoIP, HTTP or FTP. 
Figure 4.11 Throughput from Router2 to Router3 for VOIP application. 
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The previous figures illustrated the throughput between Router2 and Router3 in 
both directions. They show that throughput starts to decrease at time 300 due to the start 
of blackholing at that time. Note that the solutions start at time 350.  
Note that the throughput does not reach 0 bits per second because the figures 
reflect a time average throughput; and therefore earlier throughput values prevent the 
overall throughput from reaching 0 bits per second.  
The following figures illustrate the effect of the applied solutions by studying 
the traffic between Router2 and Router4 in both directions. Figure 4.12 shows the 
throughput, in bits per second, for HTTP traffic from Router2 to Router4. 
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Figure 4.12 Outgoing Traffic From Router2 to Router4 for HTTP Application. 
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From the figure it is clear that the throughput for Internet delay of 5 seconds is 
about half the throughput of 0.1 second Internet delay. For the same Internet delay, 
different solutions show a similar behavior in terms of outgoing traffic towards Router4.  
Figure 4.12 shows that the HTTP throughput reaches almost 9000 bits per 
second for the Internet delay 0.1 seconds which is the same throughput as in Figure 4.6. 
On the other hand, the HTTP throughput for the Internet delay 5 seconds in Figure 4.12 
is over 4000 bits per second while in Figure 4.6 it is slightly above 2000 bits per second. 
Because the 5 seconds Internet delay causes a high initial convergence time, the 
throughput in Figure 4.6 does not reach the same level as in Figure 4.12 due to the 
triggering of the blackholing.  
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Figure 4.13 shows the throughput, in bits per second, for FTP traffic from Router2 to 
Router4. In the figure, no difference can be seen when using 0.1 seconds or 5 seconds 
Internet delay due to configuring FTP with an inter-request time of 360 seconds which less 
FTP requests and causing the effect of the Internet delay to diminish. Note that when the 
inter-request time is set to 60 seconds there will be a difference between the 0.1 seconds 
delay and the 5 seconds delay as shown in Appendix D.  
Figure 4.13 shows clearly a difference in the throughput between the 0.1 and the 
5 seconds Internet delay when comparing Figure 4.7 to Figure 4.13. The reason for this 
difference is the slow convergence of the 5 seconds delay.  
Figure 4.13 Throughput from Router 2 to Router 4 for FTP Application. 
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
0
8
0
1
6
0
2
4
0
3
2
0
4
0
0
4
8
0
5
6
0
6
4
0
7
2
0
8
0
0
8
8
0
9
6
0
1
0
4
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
0
0
1
2
8
0
1
3
6
0
1
4
4
0
1
5
2
0
1
6
0
0
1
6
8
0
1
7
6
0
1
8
4
0
1
9
2
0
2
0
0
0
b
it
s/
se
co
n
d
Throughput 2->4, FTP, Time Average
Shorten, FTP, 0.1, 20% MoreSpec, FTP, 0.1, 20% Community, FTP, 0.1, 20%
Shorten, FTP, 0.1, 50% MoreSpec, FTP, 0.1, 50% Community, FTP, 0.1, 50%
Shorten, FTP, 0.1, 80% MoreSpec, FTP, 0.1, 80% Community, FTP, 0.1, 80%
Shorten, FTP, 5, 20% MoreSpec, FTP,5, 20% Community, FTP, 5, 20%
Shorten, FTP, 5, 50% MoreSpec, FTP, 5, 50% Community, FTP, 5, 50%
Shorten, FTP, 5, 80% MoreSpec, FTP, 5, 80% Community, FTP, 5, 80%
78 
Figure 4.14 shows the throughput, in bits per second, for VoIP traffic from 
Router2 to Router4. VoIP is a real time application which runs over UDP which does 
not have flow control nor does it have congestion control. Thus, we cannot notice any 
difference in the throughput of VoIP traffic for 0.1 seconds or 5 seconds Internet delay. 
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Figure 4.14 Throughput from Router2 to Router4 in VOIP Application. 
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Figure 4.15 shows the throughput from Router4 to Router2 for the HTTP 
application. 
 
Figure 4.15 shows a higher  throughput for the 5 seconds Internet delay than the 
throughput of the 5 seconds Internet delay scenario shown in Figure 4.9. The lower 
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Figure 4.15 Throughput from Router4 to Router2 for HTTP Application. 
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throughput noticed in Figure 4.9 is due to the fact that increase in the throughput was 
interrupted by the blackhoaling activity. 
Figure 4.16 shows the throughput, in bits per second, for FTP traffic from 
Router4 to Router2. It is clear from the figure that a higher load results in slightly lower 
throughput in FTP. The reason behind this is that the FTP traffic is not exposed to TCP 
congestion control due to the inter-request time begin set to 360 seconds. Accordingly, 
there is no difference in the FTP throughput for different loads and different Internet 
delays.  
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Figure 4.16 Throughput from Router4 to Router2 in FTP application. 
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From Figure 4.16 and Figure 4.13 the throughput does not change when 
changing either the load or the Internet delay for all the solutions due to higher inter-
request time which prevents the TCP congestion control. Moreover, it clear from the 
figures that the throughput are almost the same in both directions. The main reason for 
that is that the Command Mix for the FTP experiments is configured with the Command 
Mix set to 50%, which means that the ‘Get’ command is 50% and the ‘Put’ command 
is the other 50%. This results in similar traffic throughput. On the other hand, the HTTP 
throughput in Figure 4.15 is lower than the HTTP throughput in Figure 4.12 because the 
size of the file sent from the server to the client is larger than the requests sent from the 
client to the server. Hence, the amount of traffic from Router2 to Router4 is more than 
the amount of traffic from Router4 to Router2. 
Figure 4.17 shows the throughput from Router4 to Router2 in the VoIP 
application. Increasing the load or the delay of the Internet does not have a significant 
impact on throughput for the same reasons as pointed out when discussing the results of 
Figure 4.14. 
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4.2.3.1. Application Level Throughput 
In this section, we discuss and present figures of the traffic sent and received by 
LAN_East for different applications.  
Figure 4.18 shows the HTTP traffic sent from the LAN_East subnet.   
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Figure 4.17 Throughput from Router4 to Router2 in VOIP Application. 
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The figure also shows the effect of the Internet delay on the packets sent. The 
packets sent when the Internet delay is 0.1 second is almost double the packets sent with 
a 5 seconds Internet delay. Moreover, the figure shows that the traffic is zero during the 
time of blackholing (300-360). 
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Figure 4.18 HTTP Packet Sent by LAN_East. 
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Figure 4.19 shows the HTTP packets received by LAN_East. 
 
Figure 4.19 HTTP Packet Received by LAN_East. 
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The packets received reduce to 0 in all experiments during the period of 
blackholing. Figure 4.20 shows the FTP packets sent from the LAN_East subnet. The 
figure clearly shows that the number of packets sent during the time of blackholing 
reduces to zero.  
  
 
Figure 4.21 shows the FTP packets received by LAN_East. From the figure we 
can notice that there are no packets received during the period of blackholing. Moreover, 
there are no packets received for the 5 seconds Internet delay until the recovery from 
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Figure 4.20 FTP Packets Sent from LAN_East. 
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blackholing. The main reason for this is the long inter-request time in conjunction with 
the higher convergence delay that is associated with the 5 seconds Internet delay. When 
the solution is applied and network converges, it starts the initialization of FTP which 
affects when LAN_East starts receiving packets from LAN_West.  
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Figure 4.21 FTP Packet Received to LAN East. 
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Figure 4.22 shows the VoIP packet sent from LAN_East. The figure shows that 
the traffic load and the Internet delay have no effect on the amount of packets sent. The 
reason behind such a behavior is the fact that VoIP runs over UDP which is unaffected 
by the presence of blockholing. 
Figure 4.22 VoIP Traffic Sent from LAN_East. 
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Figure 4.23 shows the VoIP packets received by LAN_East. Due to the 
exponential delay with 5 seconds as a mean for the VoIP application it can be clearly 
noticed the high traffic fluctuating for the 5 seconds Internet delay scenario. Also, the 
figure shows that the traffic is zero during the time of blackholing.  
Figure 4.23 VoIP Traffic Received by LAN_East. 
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Figure 4.24 shows the page response time for the HTTP application for different 
solutions, load, and delay of the Internet. 
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Figure 4.24 Page Response time for HTTP Client. 
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Figure 4.24 shows that the page response time is higher when the Internet delay 
is high. The FTP download response time shown in Figure 4.25 has the same 
characteristics as that shown in Figure 4.24 for HTTP. 
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Figure 4.25 FTP Download Response Time. 
91 
4.3. Comparison With IPv4 
In this section, we compare our results with the IPv4 results obtained by 
Alrefai[1]. The comparison is with respect to the percentage of dropped packets, the 
convergence time, and the throughput. 
Figure 4.26 shows the percentage of dropped packets as obtained by Alrefai [1]. 
Comparing Figure 4.3 with Figure 4.26 we notice that there are less packet drops 
in our study. Our study shows a 14% improvement in the percentage of the dropped 
packets percentage over the IPv4 percentage of the dropping packets. Moreover, our 
study shows an improvement of %19 in the percentage of the dropped packets over IPv4 
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Figure 4.26 Packet drop percentages [1]. 
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results for VoIP application. This might be due to the better performance of IPv6 
specially with the real time application, and the improved handling of IPv6 of big files 
as compared to IPv4 [17]. 
On the other hand, when comparing the convergence time in our study against 
that of Alrefai [1] we notice that the results differ dependent on the Internet delay as 
shown in Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 in this study, and Figure 4.27 and Figure 4.28 as 
obtained by  Alrefai [1].  
 
Figure 4.27 BGP convergence time for 0.1 seconds delay of Internet[1]. 
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It can be noticed that there is an increase in the convergence time in IPv6 when 
compared against the IPv4 results obtained by Alrefai [1] for the 0.1 second Internet 
delay. More specifically, our study shows that there is an increase in convergence time 
for the 0.1 seconds by about 12% for HTTP application, about 7% for the FTP, and 13% 
for the VoIP application over the results of IPv4. This increase might be due to the large 
size of the address space of IPv6 which affects the time it takes to update the routers 
tables. In contrast, when the Internet delay is 5 seconds we notice that the convergence 
time in our study mostly matches that of Alrefai [1] except for VoIP where our study 
shows better convergence by about 20%. The reason behind such a behavior is that the 
5 seconds Internet delay dominates the extra convergence time associated with IPv6 
routers tables updates. Moreover, the IPv6 convergence time for VoIP is smaller than 
Figure 4.28 BGP convergence time for 5 second delay [1].   
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that for IPv4 because of the better performance of IPv6 with respect to real time 
applications [19].  
The shortening and community solutions perform better in IPv6 than IPv4 for 
about 12%. This mostly due to the improved structure of router tables under IPv6 which 
results in less prefix selection time. Subsequently, community and shorten solutions 
under IPv6takes less time than IPv4. 
The throughput for all applications in our study is slightly higher than those 
reported by Alrefai [1]. Our study shows increase in the throughput by 3% for HTTP 
application, 25% for FTP application, and 21% for the VoIP.  This is mainly because of 
the higher packet size of IPv6 as compared to the IPv4 packet size.   
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4.4. Cases When The Simulation Fails 
There are some unexpected behavior for the experiments with the VoIP 
application. The experiments for the VoIP application with an Internet delay of 5 
seconds and for most scenarios of 50% link load and all the scenarios of 80% link load, 
the traffic switches back and forth between the malicious and the non-malicious routers. 
This case and others are shown in Figure 4.26. 
 
This behavior of the traffic happens mainly due to BGP messages hindering. 
This is because the Internet node is configured with an exponential delay of 5 seconds 
as mean for the delay. Accordingly, BGP messages suffer from the high delay and the 
Figure 4. 29 Packets Drop  in VoIP, More Specific solution, Exponential with 5 
second delay, 80 link load. 
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load links which result in delayed and out of order BGP messages. The problem is 
aggravated further by the fact that VoIP is a real time application that requires high 
traffic demand. For more detailed explanation  of the problem see section 6.3 in Alrefai 
[1]. 
4.5. Summary 
In this chapter, we evaluated the performance of using the BGP tuning 
techniques to solve the Internet access denial problem that is caused by malicious ISP. 
The solution type, delay of Internet, type of application, and the load in terms of putting 
more load on specific links are the factors studied in our simulation. The percentage of 
packet drop, convergence time, throughput, application packet sent and received, page 
response time, and download response time are the metrics used in the evaluation. 
Finally, we compared our results with the results obtained by Alrefai [1]. 
 
CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
5.1. Conclusion 
The goal of this thesis work is to implement, evaluate and compare approaches 
to solve the problem of Internet access denial that is caused by malicious ISPs in IPv6 
networks. All the solutions tested are BGP based solutions. The thesis focuses on three 
BGP-based techniques to solve the problem; AS-Path shortening, more specific prefix, 
and community. The thesis then describes the design, implementation, and validation of 
the BGP tuning techniques used. A performance evaluation is provided for the BGP 
tuning techniques. The performance is conducted in terms of type of solution, Internet 
delay, application type, and load. BGP convergence time, throughput, packet drop, and 
response time are the metrics used for comparison. Based on the results obtained, the 
more specific prefix method has the lowest convergence time while the shortening and 
community methods have almost the same convergence time. However, the community 
method has the lowest dropped packets percentage. All methods have almost the same 
performance for the throughput. Finally, the results of the performance evaluation were 
compared against the results obtained by Alrefai [1]. 
5.2. Future Work 
The work done in this thesis can be extended further as follows:  
 Evaluate the methods used in this work with different simulation tools such as 
network simulator (NS3) [16]. 
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 Apply the methods on a prototype system and compare the results with our 
simulation results. 
 Implement virtual peering methods as a solution to the Internet access denial 
problem and evaluate the performance of these methods for IPv6 network. 
 Devise and test solutions using IPv6 specific features such as flow label and multi-
hop. 
 
Appendix A 
APPLICATION CONFIGURATION 
In this appendix we present the configuration of the protocols used in the 
experiments. The configurations of TCP, HTTP, FTP and VoIP are shown. The 
configuration shows the default OPNET parameters which we have used.  
A.1 TCP configuration 
Figure  A.1 shows the TCP configuration used. 
 
Figure A. 1 TCP Configuration. 
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A.2 HTTP Configuration 
Figure A.2 shows the HTTP configuration. HTTP 1.1 is the default version used 
by OPNET and in our experiments.  The page Interarrival time is exponentially 
distributed with mean 60 seconds.  
Figure  A.3 shows the properties of an HTTP page. Each page has five medium 
sized images in addition to 1000 bytes page size.  
 
 
Figure A. 3 HTTP Page Properties. 
Figure A. 2 HTTP  Configuration. 
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The image used has a uniform distribution between 500 and 2000 bytes and us 
shown in Figure A.4. 
 
Figure  A.5 shows the server selection where the number of pages per server was 
set to be exponentially distributed with mean 10 pages. 
 
A.3 FTP Configuration 
The FTP configuration table is shown in Figure  A.6. The Inter-Request time is 
exponentially distributed with mean 360 seconds. The Get command is 50% of total 
commands. The downloaded file size is 50000 bytes. 
 
Figure A. 4 Size of Image. 
Figure A. 5 HTTP Server Selection. 
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A.4 VoIP Configuration 
Figure A.7 shows the VoIP configurations table. As shown, there is one voice 
frame per packet and the GSM FR encoding scheme is used. The silence length and talk 
spurt length use the default values that are shown in  Figure A.8 and A.9, respectively. 
Both incoming and outgoing are exponentially distributed with mean 0.65 seconds. 
Also, both incoming and outgoing talk spurt length is exponentially distributed with a 
mean of 0.352 seconds. 
Figure A. 6 FTP Configuration. 
Figure A. 7 VoIP Configuration. 
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Figure A. 8   Talk Spurt Length  
Figure A. 9  Silence Length configuration. 
. 
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APPENDIX B 
BASELINE THROUGHPUT  
In this appendix we present the results for the base line simulations. The base 
line simulations are for HTTP, FTP and VoIP for 0.1 second and 5 seconds Internet 
delay without any malicious activity. The traffic of the our model without any malicious 
activity passes through Router3. Thus, we show only the throughput between Router2 
and Router in both directions. 
Figure B.1 shows the throughput between Router2 and Router3 for HTTP 
traffic.   
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Figure B. 1 Baseline HTTP Throughput from Router2 to Router3. 
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Figure B.2 shows the throughput from Router3 to Router2 for HTTP traffic. 
Figure B.3 shows the baseline throughput for FTP from Router2 to Router3. 
Figure B.4 shows the throughput from Router3 to Router2 for FTP traffic. 
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Figure B. 2 Baseline HTTP Throughput from Router3 to Route2   
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Figure B. 3 Baseline Throughput from Router2 to Router3 for FTP traffic. 
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Figure  B.5 shows the throughput from Router2 to Router3 fro VoIP traffic. 
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Figure B. 4 Baseline Throughput From Router3 to Router2 for FTP traffic. 
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Figure B. 5 Baseline Throughput from Router2 to Router3 for VoIP traffic. 
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Figure B.6 shows the throughput from Router3 to Router2 for VoIP traffic. 
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Figure B. 6 Baseline Throughput From Router3 to Router2 for VoIP Traffic. 
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Appendix C 
CODE MODIFICATION 
In this appendix we present our code modifications to Alrefai’s code to account for IPv6 . 
Our Specific modifications are shown underlined in each of the following code segments. 
C.1 ReconfigIn State 
 
 
  
   
num_entries = op_prg_list_size(bgp_connections_list_ptr); 
for(count_i = 0; count_i < num_entries; count_i++ ) 
 { 
 bgp_conn_info_ptr = op_prg_list_access (bgp_connections_list_ptr, 
count_i); 
 if(bgp_conn_info_ptr->neighbor_as_number == a_timed_policy-
>neighbor_as) 
  break; 
 } 
op_pro_invoke (bgp_conn_info_ptr->bgp_connection_prohandle,  
a_timed_policy->rte_policy_ptr); 
 
//*/ 
/* almehdhar modifycations to  Update State */ 
  
if (bgp_conn_info_ptr == OPC_NIL) 
        { 
  /* There is no matching BGP neighbor process that has uses the tcp 
 */ 
  
         
    /* Drop the packet. */ 
    op_pk_destroy (intrpt_info.msg_pkptr);  
    intrpt_info.msg_pkptr = OPC_NIL;  
     } 
    else 
     { 
/* Update the statistics on the amount of traffic received.  
  */ 
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bgp_traffic_rcvd_stats_update ((double) total_size,  
 
received_packet_type); 
     
/* Process found. Invoke the peer and to handle the update message. 
 */ 
op_pro_invoke (bgp_conn_info_ptr->bgp_connection_prohandle, 
&intrpt_info); 
     
/* removed from the Loc-RIB.                         
  */ 
if (bgp_conn_info_ptr->unreachable_rte_exists == OPC_TRUE) 
 { 
 /* Get the list of unreachables routes form the mailbox area. 
 */ 
/*almehdhar codemodivicaton*/ 
if (BGPC_ADDR_FAMILY_ATTR_IPV4 == tmp_int) 
   addr_family = BgpC_Ipv4_Address; 
  else if (BGPC_ADDR_FAMILY_ATTR_IPV6 == tmp_int) 
   addr_family = BgpC_Ipv6_Address; 
 
 
 unreachability_list_ptr = bgp_conn_info_ptr-
>unreachable_rte_list_ptr; 
 if (ip_node_is_pe (ip_module_data_ptr) &&  
  (bgp_conn_info_ptr->neighbor_site_vrf_name != OPC_NIL)) 
  bgp_prefix_list_ipv6_to_vpnv4_convert (unreachability_list_ptr, 
bgp_conn_info_ptr->neighbor_site_vrf_name); 
  
 /* Process the information and re-set the flag.           
 */ 
 bgp_unfeasible_routes_process (unreachability_list_ptr, 
bgp_conn_info_ptr->peer_id); 
  
 /* Make sure that the flag is reset to false so that the next set 
of*/ 
 /* unfeasible routes can be properly communicated.         
 */ 
 bgp_conn_info_ptr->unreachable_rte_exists = OPC_FALSE; 
 } 
 
 
else 
 { 
 /* Force the unreachability list pointer to be NULL. This value  */ 
 /* will be passed to the procedure that will propagate the new 
 */ 
 /* status of the Local-RIB to all the neighbors.                 */ 
 unreachability_list_ptr = OPC_NIL; 
 } 
/* Check to see if new routes have been added to the RIB-In  
  */ 
if (bgp_conn_info_ptr->adj_rib_in_ptr->num_new_routes > 0) 
 { 
 /* Collect the new routes from the temporary list into the new 
 */ 
 /* routes list.        
      */ 
 for (count_i = 0; count_i < bgp_conn_info_ptr->adj_rib_in_ptr-
>num_new_routes; count_i++) 
  { 
  /* All new routes should be on top of the list. Access the 
 */ 
  /* the new routes and add them to the list.   
   */ 
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/* almehdhar code modification*/ 
  new_rte_entry_ptr = (BgpT_Rte_Entry*) op_prg_list_remove 
(bgp_conn_info_ptr->adj_rib_in_ptr->new_routes_lptr, OPC_LISTPOS_HEAD); 
  
  if (BgpC_Conn_Type_Ebgp == bgp_conn_info_ptr-
>bgp_connection_type) 
   { 
   new_rte_entry_ptr->admin = admin_distance; 
   } 
  else 
   { 
   new_rte_entry_ptr->admin = ibgp_admin_distance; 
   } 
   
  /* Check if this new entry is from a VPN site   
  */ 
  if (ip_node_is_pe (ip_module_data_ptr) &&  
   (bgp_conn_info_ptr->neighbor_site_vrf_name != OPC_NIL)) 
   { 
/*almehdhar codemodivicaton*/ 
 
   /* Check if this new entry is from a VPN site. And RD 
and  */ 
   /* values are not set for this route. If it is  
  */ 
   /* then set the route distinguisher value for the entry 
 */ 
   bgp_new_rte_at_vpn_pe_process (new_rte_entry_ptr, 
bgp_conn_info_ptr->neighbor_site_vrf_name); 
   } 
   
  op_prg_list_insert (new_rte_list_ptr, new_rte_entry_ptr, 
OPC_LISTPOS_HEAD); 
 
  /* Continue till all the new routes have been inserted. 
  */ 
  } 
  
 
 /* Call the procedure that will process the new routes.  
  */ 
 bgp_reachability_info_process (bgp_conn_info_ptr); 
    
 /* Reset the number of new routes to 0 and destroy the temporary */ 
 /* list.         
      */ 
 bgp_conn_info_ptr->adj_rib_in_ptr->num_new_routes = 0; 
 op_prg_mem_free (bgp_conn_info_ptr->adj_rib_in_ptr->new_routes_lptr); 
 } 
 
/* Find out the number of new routes that were entered into the local  */ 
/* routing table. This would not only be the number of routes that 
 */ 
/* that were received as a part of the advertisement, but also could */ 
/* contain the replacement routes that were selected after certain 
 */ 
/* routes were termed infeasible.      
    */ 
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number_of_new_routes = op_prg_list_size (new_rte_list_ptr); 
 
/* If any of the list is valid, then all the peer processes have to  */ 
/* be notified about the change in the routing table status.       */ 
if ((number_of_new_routes > 0) || unreachability_list_ptr != OPC_NIL) 
 { 
 /* Unless this is a dummy node representing an external AS,   */ 
 /* propagate the new routes to all the other neighbors.   
 */ 
 
 if (OPC_FALSE == is_external_as_node) 
  { 
  bgp_new_routes_propagate (unreachability_list_ptr, 
number_of_new_routes, bgp_conn_info_ptr->peer_id); 
  } 
 
 /* Clean up just the new_rte_list_ptr by removing all the route  */ 
 /* entries in it. Be sure not to free up the memory of the   */ 
 /* route entries as these entries are used by the route tables.  */ 
 for (count_i = 0; count_i < number_of_new_routes; count_i++) 
  { 
  /* remove the routes entries from the new route list.   */ 
  op_prg_list_remove (new_rte_list_ptr, OPC_LISTPOS_HEAD); 
  } 
 
 /* Clean up the unreachble routes list. The prefixes in this list */ 
 /* can be freed up. The will not be reference by any route entry. */ 
 if (unreachability_list_ptr != OPC_NIL) 
  { 
  /* Destroy the list of unreachable routes.    
  */ 
  bgp_support_rte_list_destroy (unreachability_list_ptr); 
  bgp_conn_info_ptr->unreachable_rte_list_ptr = OPC_NIL; 
  } 
 } 
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C.2 ReconfigOut State 
 
 
  
/* you still need to the update message must include the original*/ 
           
  
num_entries = op_prg_list_size(bgp_connections_list_ptr); 
for(count_i = 0; count_i < num_entries; count_i++ ) 
 { 
 bgp_conn_info_ptr = op_prg_list_access (bgp_connections_list_ptr, 
count_i); 
 if(bgp_conn_info_ptr->neighbor_as_number == a_timed_policy-
>neighbor_as) 
  break; 
 } 
rte_list_ptr = bgp_conn_info_ptr->adj_rib_out_ptr->rte_list_ptr; 
num_entries = op_prg_list_size (rte_list_ptr); 
new_rte_list_ptr = op_prg_list_create(); 
if (! a_timed_policy->isMoreSpecific) 
 { 
 
 bgp_conn_info_ptr->adj_rib_out_ptr->new_routes_lptr = 
op_prg_list_create (); 
 bgp_conn_info_ptr->adj_rib_out_ptr->num_new_routes = 0; 
 unreachability_list_ptr = op_prg_list_create(); 
 for (count_i = 0; count_i < num_entries; count_i++) 
  { 
  rte_entry_ptr = (BgpT_Rte_Entry*) op_prg_list_access 
(rte_list_ptr, count_i); 
  new_rte_entry_ptr = bgp_support_rte_entry_copy(rte_entry_ptr); 
  rte_maps = op_prg_list_create(); 
  op_prg_list_insert(rte_maps, a_timed_policy->rte_policy_ptr, 
OPC_LISTPOS_TAIL); 
 
 if(bgp_support_rte_filter_policy_apply(&new_rte_entry_ptr, rte_maps, 
OPC_NIL, OPC_NIL, OPC_FALSE, &policy_edited,  
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bgp_conn_info_ptr->bgp_connection_type, bgp_conn_info_ptr-
>local_info_ptr) == OPC_TRUE) 
   { 
   if (policy_edited == OPC_TRUE) 
    { 
     
    bgp_support_rte_entry_print(rte_entry_ptr); 
    new_mp_prefix_ptr = (BgpT_Mp_Prefix*) 
bgp_support_mp_prefix_copy(rte_entry_ptr->dest_prefix_ptr); 
    if(new_mp_prefix_ptr == OPC_NIL) 
 bgp_support_mp_prefix_print (prefix_str, new_mp_prefix_ptr); 
 op_prg_list_insert (bgp_conn_info_ptr->unreachable_rte_list_ptr 
,new_mp_prefix_ptr, OPC_LISTPOS_HEAD); 
if (BGPC_ADDR_FAMILY_ATTR_IPV4 == tmp_int) 
   addr_family = BgpC_Ipv4_Address; 
  else if (BGPC_ADDR_FAMILY_ATTR_IPV6 == tmp_int) 
   addr_family = BgpC_Ipv6_Address; 
 
  bgp_conn_info_ptr->unreachable_rte_exists = OPC_TRUE; 
  bgp_support_ith_rte_entry_replace (bgp_conn_info_ptr-
>adj_rib_out_ptr, count_i, new_rte_entry_ptr); 
    op_prg_list_insert (new_rte_list_ptr, 
new_rte_entry_ptr, OPC_LISTPOS_TAIL); 
  bgp_conn_info_ptr->adj_rib_out_ptr->num_new_routes++; 
 op_prg_list_insert (bgp_conn_info_ptr->adj_rib_out_ptr-
>new_routes_lptr,new_rte_entry_ptr, OPC_LISTPOS_TAIL); 
    } 
   } 
  else 
   { 
   /* Restrict this route.     
 */ 
   bgp_support_rte_entry_destroy (new_rte_entry_ptr); 
   /* Update the statistics that indicate the number   */ 
   /* routes that were dropped due to route policies.  */ 
op_stat_write (bgp_conn_info_ptr->local_info_ptr-
>bgp_local_stats.num_policy_discards_local_stat_hndl, 1.0); 
 op_stat_write (bgp_conn_info_ptr->local_info_ptr-
>bgp_local_stats.num_policy_discards_local_stat_hndl, 0.0); 
   } 
  } 
  
 if (ip_node_is_pe (ip_module_data_ptr) &&  
  (bgp_conn_info_ptr->neighbor_site_vrf_name != OPC_NIL)) 
  bgp_prefix_list_ipv6_to_vpnv6_convert (bgp_conn_info_ptr-
>unreachable_rte_list_ptr, bgp_conn_info_ptr->neighbor_site_vrf_name); 
number_of_new_routes = op_prg_list_size (new_rte_list_ptr); 
 bgp_support_rte_table_print(bgp_conn_info_ptr->adj_rib_out_ptr); 
 
114 
 
  
/* Clean up just the new_rte_list_ptr by removing all the route  */ 
  /* entries in it. Be sure not to free up the memory of the 
 */ 
  /* route entries as these entries are used by the route tables.
  */ 
  /* remove the routes entries from the new route list. 
 */ 
   
  { 
  op_pro_invoke (bgp_conn_info_ptr->bgp_connection_prohandle, 
OPC_NIL); 
  for (count_i = 0; count_i < number_of_new_routes; count_i++) 
   { 
   ///* remove the routes entries from the new route list.
   
   op_prg_list_remove (new_rte_list_ptr, OPC_LISTPOS_HEAD); 
   } 
  if(OPC_NIL != bgp_conn_info_ptr->unreachable_rte_list_ptr) 
   { 
   bgp_support_rte_list_destroy(bgp_conn_info_ptr-
>unreachable_rte_list_ptr); 
   bgp_conn_info_ptr->unreachable_rte_list_ptr = OPC_NIL; 
   bgp_conn_info_ptr->unreachable_rte_exists = OPC_FALSE; 
   } 
  } 
 } 
else 
 { 
 /* Here we want to handle more specific prefixes*/ 
 
  bgp_conn_info_ptr->adj_rib_out_ptr->new_routes_lptr = 
op_prg_list_create(); 
 bgp_conn_info_ptr->adj_rib_out_ptr->num_new_routes = 0; 
 for(count_i = 0; count_i < number_of_new_routes; count_i++) 
  { 
  op_prg_list_insert(bgp_conn_info_ptr->adj_rib_out_ptr-
>new_routes_lptr,  
  bgp_support_rte_entry_copy((BgpT_Rte_Entry*) 
op_prg_list_access(new_rte_list_ptr, count_i)), OPC_LISTPOS_TAIL); 
//  bgp_support_rte_entry_print((BgpT_Rte_Entry*) 
op_prg_list_access(bgp_conn_info_ptr->adj_rib_out_ptr->new_routes_lptr, 
OPC_LISTPOS_TAIL)); 
//  bgp_conn_info_ptr->adj_rib_out_ptr->num_new_routes++; 
  } 
 
 bgp_conn_info_ptr->adj_rib_out_ptr->num_new_routes = 
op_prg_list_size(new_rte_list_ptr); 
 if(bgp_conn_info_ptr->adj_rib_out_ptr->num_new_routes > 0 || 
bgp_conn_info_ptr->unreachable_rte_exists == OPC_TRUE) 
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   /* read the prefix and the number of bits to divide*/ 
 /* search for it in rib out      */ 
 /* if found store route attribute */ 
 /* divide it into list of prefixes */ 
 /* create the route with the same path attribute of rib out */ 
 /* add the routes to rib out */ 
 /* send it to the specific neighbor by invoking the process!! */ 
  
 mp_prefix_ptr = a_timed_policy->prefix_ptr; 
 rte_entry_ptr = bgp_support_rte_entry_find (bgp_conn_info_ptr-
>adj_rib_out_ptr, mp_prefix_ptr, &location); 
  
 if (rte_entry_ptr != OPC_NIL) 
  { 
  num_prefixes = op_prg_list_size (a_timed_policy-
>mp_prefixes_list); 
  if (num_prefixes > 0) 
   { 
   bgp_conn_info_ptr->adj_rib_out_ptr->new_routes_lptr = 
op_prg_list_create(); 
 
   bgp_conn_info_ptr->adj_rib_out_ptr->num_new_routes = 0; 
   for (count_i = 0; count_i < num_prefixes; count_i++) 
    { 
    new_mp_prefix_ptr = op_prg_list_access 
(a_timed_policy->mp_prefixes_list, count_i); 
    new_rte_entry_ptr = 
bgp_support_rte_entry_copy(rte_entry_ptr); 
    new_rte_entry_ptr->dest_prefix_ptr = 
new_mp_prefix_ptr; 
 
    op_prg_list_insert(bgp_conn_info_ptr-
>adj_rib_out_ptr->new_routes_lptr, new_rte_entry_ptr, OPC_LISTPOS_TAIL); 
    bgp_conn_info_ptr->adj_rib_out_ptr-
>num_new_routes++; 
    bgp_support_rte_entry_insert (bgp_conn_info_ptr-
>adj_rib_out_ptr, new_rte_entry_ptr); 
    } 
    if(bgp_conn_info_ptr->adj_rib_out_ptr-
>num_new_routes > 0) 
    { 
    op_pro_invoke (bgp_conn_info_ptr-
>bgp_connection_prohandle, OPC_NIL); 
    for (count_i = 0; count_i < number_of_new_routes; 
count_i++) 
     { 
     // remove the routes entries from the new 
route list.    
     op_prg_list_remove (new_rte_list_ptr, 
OPC_LISTPOS_HEAD); 
     } 
    } 
   } 
  } 
    
 } 
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C.3 Changes in BGP Module 
Modification in bgp_conn Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
static void bgp_conn_apply_map_rib_in (IpT_Rte_Policy* rte_policy_ptr) 
 { 
 List* rte_maps; 
 Boolean edit_status; 
 List* rte_list_ptr; 
 BgpT_Rte_Entry* rte_entry_ptr; 
 BgpT_Rte_Entry* new_rte_entry_ptr; 
 int   num_entries; 
 int   count_i; 
 /* what needed to be done 
 1. loop the rib in    2. copy each entry 
 3. apply policy       4. if accepted process the new route 
 */ 
 FIN(bgp_conn_apply_map_rib_in (rte_policy_ptr)); 
 rte_list_ptr = bgp_my_adj_rib_in_ptr->rte_list_ptr; 
 num_entries = op_prg_list_size (rte_list_ptr); 
if (BGPC_ADDR_FAMILY_ATTR_IPV4 == tmp_int) 
   addr_family = BgpC_Ipv4_Address; 
  else if (BGPC_ADDR_FAMILY_ATTR_IPV6 == tmp_int) 
   addr_family = BgpC_Ipv6_Address; 
 
      /** Convert a list of IP prefixes into MP-prefixes. **/ 
 for (ith_prefix = 0; ith_prefix < num_prefixes; ith_prefix++) 
  { 
  ip_prefix_ptr = (BgpT_Ip_Prefix *) op_prg_list_remove 
(prefix_lptr, ith_prefix); 
   
  op_prg_list_insert (prefix_lptr, 
     bgp_support_mp_prefix_from_ip_prefix (ip_prefix_ptr),  
     ith_prefix); 
  } 
 bgp_my_adj_rib_in_ptr->new_routes_lptr = op_prg_list_create 
(); 
 for (count_i = 0; count_i < num_entries; count_i++) 
  { 
  rte_entry_ptr = (BgpT_Rte_Entry*) op_prg_list_access 
(rte_list_ptr, count_i); 
  new_rte_entry_ptr = bgp_support_rte_entry_copy(rte_entry_ptr); 
 /* because the method of applying policy only accept list of policies 
   we need to create a list and insert rte_policy_ptr to it.*/ 
  rte_maps = op_prg_list_create(); 
  op_prg_list_insert(rte_maps, rte_policy_ptr, OPC_LISTPOS_TAIL); 
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  if(bgp_support_rte_filter_policy_apply(&new_rte_entry_ptr, 
rte_maps, OPC_NIL, OPC_NIL, OPC_TRUE, &edit_status, BgpC_Conn_Type_None, 
conn_info_ptr->local_info_ptr) == OPC_TRUE) 
  { 
   if(edit_status) 
    { 
    bgp_conn_route_entry_process(new_rte_entry_ptr); 
    } 
   } 
  else 
   { 
    //bgp_conn_previously_advertised_route_check 
(new_rte_entry_ptr->dest_prefix_ptr); 
    //bgp_support_rte_entry_destroy (new_rte_entry_ptr); 
   } 
  } 
 if (bgp_my_adj_rib_in_ptr->num_new_routes == 0) 
  op_prg_mem_free (bgp_my_adj_rib_in_ptr->new_routes_lptr); 
 FOUT; 
 } 
 
 
118 
C.4 Shortening 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The function bgp_support_as_path_remove_first is shown in  
 
  
static void bgp_support_as_path_prepend (BgpT_Path_Attrs* 
path_attrs_ptr, const IpT_Rte_Map_AsPath_List* as_list_ptr) { 
     
    int*            new_segment_value_array; 
    int                 as_seg_index; 
    int                 as_list_index; 
    int                 seg_length; 
    BgpT_Path_Segment*  path_segment_ptr; 
 
 /** Prepend the ASes specified in the list to the AS Path.
 **/ 
 
 FIN (bgp_support_as_path_prepend (path_attrs_ptr, 
as_list_ptr)); 
/*almehdhar codemodivicaton*/ 
 
 printf("Heh I am inside prepending\n"); 
  
 if (0 == as_list_ptr->num_as_numbers) 
  { 
   printf("calling the remove first fcn\n"); 
   bgp_support_as_path_remove_first(path_attrs_ptr); 
  FOUT; 
  } 
 
 /* Add the ASes to the segment of type AS_Sequence. This
 */ 
 /* would be the first element in the list.   
  */ 
    path_segment_ptr = (BgpT_Path_Segment *) 
  op_prg_list_access (path_attrs_ptr->as_path_list_ptr, 
OPC_LISTPOS_HEAD); 
  
 /* Find out the number of AS Numbers in this segment. 
 */ 
    seg_length = path_segment_ptr->segment_length; 
 
 /* Create a new array to hold the combined as path  
 */ 
    new_segment_value_array = (int*) prg_cmo_alloc 
(bgp_as_path_list_cmh, 
  (seg_length + as_list_ptr->num_as_numbers) * sizeof 
(int)); 
  
 /* Copy the new AS Numbers from the as list to the 
beginning*/ 
 /* of the new array.       
   */ 
 for (as_list_index = 0; as_list_index < as_list_ptr-
>num_as_numbers; as_list_index++) 
  { 
  new_segment_value_array [as_list_index] = as_list_ptr-
>as_number_array [as_list_index]; 
  } 
 
    /* Copy the elements of the original array into new array.  
*/ 
    for (as_seg_index = 0; as_seg_index < seg_length; 
as_seg_index++) 
     { 
        new_segment_value_array [as_list_ptr->num_as_numbers + 
as_seg_index] = 
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 /* Free up the Old segment value array.     
 */ 
 if (seg_length > 0) 
  op_prg_mem_free (path_segment_ptr->segment_value_array); 
 
 /* Set the new value and increment the segment length.  */ 
 path_segment_ptr->segment_value_array = new_segment_value_array; 
 path_segment_ptr->segment_length +=  as_list_ptr->num_as_numbers;  
 
 /* Increment the as path length.      
 */ 
 path_attrs_ptr->as_path_length +=  as_list_ptr->num_as_numbers; 
 
    /* Done with adding. Exit the function          
 */ 
    FOUT; 
    } 
 
/* Copy the elements of the original array into new array.  */ 
  for (ith_elem = 1; ith_elem < seg_length; ith_elem++) 
      { 
   printf("ith_elem: %d\n", ith_elem); 
         new_segment_value_array [ith_elem - 1] = ith_path_segment_ptr-
>segment_value_array [ith_elem]; 
   printf("new_segment_value_array: %d \n", 
new_segment_value_array [ith_elem - 1]); 
   printf("ith_elem: %d\n", ith_elem); 
         } 
  /* Free up the 
if (seg_length > 0) 
   op_prg_mem_free(ith_path_segment_ptr-
>segment_value_array); 
  /* set the new value and increment the segment length. 
 */ 
  ith_path_segment_ptr->segment_value_array = 
new_segment_value_array; 
  (ith_path_segment_ptr->segment_length)--; 
  seg_length = ith_path_segment_ptr->segment_length; 
  for (ith_elem = 0; ith_elem < seg_length; ith_elem++) 
  { 
   printf("element# %d is %d\n", ith_elem, 
ith_path_segment_ptr->segment_value_array[ith_elem]); 
  } 
 } 
 --orig_path_attrs_ptr->as_path_length; 
  
    /* Done with adding. Exit the function          
 */ 
    FOUT; 
    } 
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void 
bgp_support_as_path_remove_first (BgpT_Path_Attrs* orig_path_attrs_ptr) 
    { 
    int*    new_segment_value_array; 
    int                 ith_elem; 
    int                 seg_length; 
    BgpT_Path_Segment*  ith_path_segment_ptr; 
  
 /** This function the last AS added to the first place of the list 
**/ 
 
    FIN (bgp_support_as_path_remove_first (orig_path_attrs_ptr)); 
 printf("we are inside remove_first :)\n"); 
 /* Add the new as to the last segment.     
  */ 
    ith_path_segment_ptr = (BgpT_Path_Segment *) 
  op_prg_list_access (orig_path_attrs_ptr->as_path_list_ptr, 
OPC_LISTPOS_TAIL); 
  
 /* Find the length of the segment value.    
 */ 
    seg_length = ith_path_segment_ptr->segment_length; 
 printf("size: %d\n",seg_length); 
 if(seg_length <= 1) 
 { 
  printf("I am changing the the segment insider"); 
  ith_path_segment_ptr = bgp_support_path_seg_mem_alloc (); 
  ith_path_segment_ptr->segment_type = 
BgpC_Path_Seg_Type_As_Sequence; 
  ith_path_segment_ptr->segment_length = 0; 
  ith_path_segment_ptr->segment_value_array = OPC_NIL; 
  op_prg_list_remove (orig_path_attrs_ptr->as_path_list_ptr, 
OPC_LISTPOS_TAIL); 
  op_prg_list_insert (orig_path_attrs_ptr->as_path_list_ptr, 
ith_path_segment_ptr, OPC_LISTPOS_TAIL); 
 } 
 else 
 { 
  /* The memeber segment value is a array of AS numbers. Copy */ 
  /* that into a new array.                                   */ 
  new_segment_value_array = (int*) prg_cmo_alloc 
(bgp_as_path_list_cmh, (seg_length-1)*sizeof (int)); 
  for (ith_elem = 0; ith_elem < seg_length; ith_elem++) 
  { 
   printf("element# %d is %d\n", ith_elem, 
ith_path_segment_ptr->segment_value_array[ith_elem]); 
  } 
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C.5 More Specific Prefixes 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
/* Alrefai Code Snippet Start */ 
static void  
bgp_neighbor_more_specific_prefix_read (Objid ith_neighbor_info_id, 
InetT_Addr_Family addr_family, int neighbor_as_number) 
 { 
 Objid     msp_objid; 
 Objid    jth_msp_info_id, jth_prefix_info_id; 
 Objid    prefix_id; 
 Objid    first_prefix_id; 
 Objid    prefixes_id; 
 int     num_msps; 
 int     count_i, count_j; 
/*almehdhar codemodivicaton*/ 
 
 char    addr_str[INETC_ADDR_RANGE_STR_LEN]; 
 InetT_Address   ntwk_addr, masked_ntwk_addr; 
 InetT_Subnet_Mask inet_smask; 
 BgpT_Ip_Prefix*  prefix_ptr; 
 int     num_prefixes; 
 double    time; 
 Timed_Policy* timed_policy_ptr; 
 BgpT_Mp_Prefix*  mp_prefix_ptr; 
 int     smask_length; 
  
 FIN (bgp_neighbor_more_specific_prefix_read (ith_neighbor_info_id, 
addr_family)); 
  
 op_ima_obj_attr_get (ith_neighbor_info_id, "More Specific Prefix", 
&msp_objid); 
 num_msps = op_topo_child_count (msp_objid, OPC_OBJTYPE_GENERIC); 
 if (num_msps > 0) 
  { 
  timed_policy_ptr = (Timed_Policy*) op_prg_mem_alloc 
(sizeof(Timed_Policy)); 
  timed_policy_ptr->isIn = OPC_FALSE; 
  timed_policy_ptr->isMoreSpecific = OPC_TRUE; 
  timed_policy_ptr->mp_prefixes_list = op_prg_list_create(); 
  } 
 for (count_i = 0; count_i < num_msps; count_i++) 
  { 
  jth_msp_info_id = op_topo_child (msp_objid, 
OPC_OBJTYPE_GENERIC, count_i); 
   
  op_ima_obj_attr_get (jth_msp_info_id, "Prefix", &prefix_id); 
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first_prefix_id = op_topo_child (prefix_id, OPC_OBJTYPE_GENERIC, 0); 
 
/*almehdhar codemodivicaton*/ 
 
  op_ima_obj_attr_get (first_prefix_id, "IP Address", addr_str); 
  ntwk_addr = inet_address_create (addr_str, InetC_Addr_Family_v6); 
  if (!inet_address_valid (ntwk_addr)) 
{bgp_invaid_network_address_log_write (count_i, addr_str); continue;} 
  op_ima_obj_attr_get (first_prefix_id, "Mask", addr_str); 
    /*alhabib*/ 
  /* IPv6 address family. If mask is auto-assigned, use a value of */ 
   /* 64. 64 is the highest permitted mask length (smallest 
network */ 
   /* size for global unicast addresses being currently allocated.
 */ 
  //addr_family=InetC_Addr_Family_v6; 
  if (InetC_Addr_Family_v6 == addr_family || 
BgpC_Ipv6_Address==addr_family) 
   { 
    if (0 == strcmp (addr_str, BGPC_SUBNET_MASK_AUTO_ASSIGN_STR)) 
    { 
    //inet_smask = inet_smask_from_length_create (64); 
    inet_smask = inet_smask_create (addr_str); 
    } 
   else 
    { 
    smask_length = atoi (addr_str); 
 
    if ((smask_length < 0) || (smask_length > 
IPC_V6_ADDR_LEN)) 
     { 
else{continue;} 
  /* Mask the network address with the subnet mask */ 
  masked_ntwk_addr = inet_address_mask (ntwk_addr, inet_smask); 
  inet_address_destroy (ntwk_addr); 
  /* Create a prefix and a route entry corresponding to it. */ 
  /* Use the "fast" version of the function so that we don't */ 
  /* create a copy of the address and then destroy the   */ 
     /* masked_ntwk_addr variable.      
  */  
/*almehdhar codemodivicaton*/ 
 
prefix_ptr = inet_address_range_mem_alloc (); 
  *prefix_ptr = inet_address_range_create_fast (masked_ntwk_addr, 
inet_smask); 
  mp_prefix_ptr = bgp_support_mp_prefix_from_ip_prefix(prefix_ptr); 
  timed_policy_ptr->prefix_ptr = 
bgp_support_mp_prefix_copy(mp_prefix_ptr); 
op_ima_obj_attr_get (jth_msp_info_id, "Prefixes", &prefixes_id); 
  num_prefixes = op_topo_child_count (prefixes_id, 
OPC_OBJTYPE_GENERIC); 
  for (count_j = 0; count_j < num_prefixes; count_j++) 
   { 
   jth_prefix_info_id = op_topo_child (prefixes_id, 
OPC_OBJTYPE_GENERIC, count_j); 
op_ima_obj_attr_get (jth_prefix_info_id, "IP Address",addr_str); 
   ntwk_addr = inet_address_create (addr_str, 
InetC_Addr_Family_v6); 
   if (!inet_address_valid (ntwk_addr)) 
{bgp_invaid_network_address_log_write (count_j, addr_str); continue;} 
   op_ima_obj_attr_get (jth_prefix_info_id, "Mask", addr_str); 
    
   /*alhabib*/ 
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/* IPv6 address family. If mask is auto-assigned, use a value of */ 
   /* 64. 64 is the highest permitted mask length (smallest 
network */ 
   /* size for global unicast addresses being currently 
allocated. */ 
/*almehdhar codemodivicaton*/ 
 
  addr_family=InetC_Addr_Family_v6; 
  if (InetC_Addr_Family_v6 == addr_family || 
BgpC_Ipv6_Address==addr_family) 
    
   { 
    if (0 == strcmp (addr_str, BGPC_SUBNET_MASK_AUTO_ASSIGN_STR)) 
    { 
    //inet_smask = inet_smask_from_length_create (64); 
    inet_smask = inet_smask_create (addr_str); 
    } 
   else 
    { 
   smask_length = atoi (addr_str); 
   if ((smask_length < 0) || (smask_length > IPC_V6_ADDR_LEN)) 
     { 
     bgp_invaid_subnet_mask_log_write (count_i, 
addr_str); 
     continue; 
     } 
   inet_smask = inet_smask_create (addr_str); 
    } 
      else{continue;} 
 masked_ntwk_addr = inet_address_mask (ntwk_addr, inet_smask); 
 inet_address_destroy (ntwk_addr); 
 prefix_ptr = inet_address_range_mem_alloc (); 
 *prefix_ptr = inet_address_range_create_fast (masked_ntwk_addr, inet_smask); 
   mp_prefix_ptr = 
bgp_support_mp_prefix_from_ip_prefix(prefix_ptr); 
op_prg_list_insert (timed_policy_ptr->mp_prefixes_list, mp_prefix_ptr, 
OPC_LISTPOS_TAIL); 
      } 
  op_ima_obj_attr_get (jth_msp_info_id, "Time", &time); 
  timed_policy_ptr->time = time; 
  timed_policy_ptr->neighbor_as = neighbor_as_number; 
  op_prg_list_insert (scheduled_reconfigurations, 
timed_policy_ptr, OPC_LISTPOS_TAIL); 
  } 
 FOUT; 
 } 
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C.6 Modification in IP protocol 
  
 
  
      Objid     malicious_blackholing_objid;  
 Objid     first_blackholing_objid; 
 Objid     prefixes_objid; 
 Objid     ith_prefix_objid; 
 int          num_blackholing; 
 int     num_prefixes; 
 IpT_Rte_Blackhole_From*       blackhole_from_ptr; 
 double    time; 
 List*     prefixes; 
 char          addr_str[INETC_ADDR_RANGE_STR_LEN]; 
 InetT_Address         ntwk_addr; 
 InetT_Subnet_Mask             inet_smask; 
 int     count_i; 
 InetT_Address_Range*  prefix_ptr; 
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/* read malicious blackholing information */ 
  op_ima_obj_attr_get(module_data.ip_parameters_objid, "Malicious 
Blackholing", &malicious_blackholing_objid); 
  num_blackholing = op_topo_child_count (malicious_blackholing_objid, 
OPC_OBJTYPE_GENERIC); 
  if (num_blackholing > 0) 
   { 
   first_blackholing_objid = op_topo_child 
(malicious_blackholing_objid, OPC_OBJTYPE_GENERIC, 0); 
   op_ima_obj_attr_get (first_blackholing_objid, "Time", &time); 
   op_ima_obj_attr_get (first_blackholing_objid, "Prefixes", 
&prefixes_objid); 
   num_prefixes = op_topo_child_count (prefixes_objid, 
OPC_OBJTYPE_GENERIC); 
   prefixes = op_prg_list_create (); 
 
/*almehdhar code modivicaton*/ 
 
   for (count_i = 0; count_i < num_prefixes; count_i++) 
    { 
    ith_prefix_objid = op_topo_child (prefixes_objid, 
OPC_OBJTYPE_GENERIC, count_i); 
    op_ima_obj_attr_get (ith_prefix_objid, "IP Address", 
addr_str); 
    ntwk_addr = inet_address_create (addr_str, 
InetC_Addr_Family_v6); 
  if (!inet_address_valid (ntwk_addr)) {printf("network invalid"); 
continue;} 
   op_ima_obj_attr_get (ith_prefix_objid, "Mask", addr_str); 
     
   inet_smask = inet_smask_create (addr_str); 
     
   prefix_ptr = inet_address_range_mem_alloc (); 
   *prefix_ptr = inet_address_range_create (ntwk_addr,inet_smask); 
   op_prg_list_insert (prefixes, prefix_ptr,OPC_LISTPOS_TAIL); 
    inet_address_destroy(ntwk_addr); 
     
 
    } 
   blackhole_from_ptr = op_prg_mem_alloc (sizeof 
(IpT_Rte_Blackhole_From)); 
   blackhole_from_ptr->time = time; 
   blackhole_from_ptr->prefixes = prefixes; 
   module_data.blackhole_from_ptr = blackhole_from_ptr; 
   } 
  else 
   { 
   module_data.blackhole_from_ptr = OPC_NIL; 
   } 
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Boolean ip_rte_blackhole_traffic (IpT_Rte_Module_Data * iprmd_ptr, 
Packet * pkptr) 
 { 
 InetT_Address_Range *  blackholed_prefix; 
 InetT_Address     dest_address; 
 InetT_Address     src_address; 
 
 
char      addr_str[INETC_ADDR_RANGE_STR_LEN]; 
 InetT_Address         ntwk_addr; 
 
 int num_prefixes; 
 IpT_Dgram_Fields* pk_fd_ptr; 
 double time; 
 List * prefixes; 
 int count_i; 
 FIN (ip_rte_blackhole_traffic (iprmd_ptr,pkptr)); 
 if (iprmd_ptr->blackhole_from_ptr == OPC_NIL) 
  { 
  FRET (OPC_FALSE); 
  } 
 iprmd_ptr->blackhole_from_ptr->number_of_packets++; 
  time = iprmd_ptr->blackhole_from_ptr->time; 
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if (op_sim_time() < time) 
  { 
  FRET (OPC_FALSE); 
  } 
 prefixes = iprmd_ptr->blackhole_from_ptr->prefixes; 
 op_pk_nfd_access (pkptr, "fields", &pk_fd_ptr); 
 dest_address = pk_fd_ptr->addr_str; 
 
        dest_address = inet_address_create (addr_str, InetC_Addr_Family_v6); 
 
 src_address = pk_fd_ptr-> addr_str; 
        src_address = inet_address_create (addr_str, InetC_Addr_Family_v6); 
 
 num_prefixes = op_prg_list_size(prefixes); 
 printf("number of packets: %d \n",iprmd_ptr->blackhole_from_ptr-
>number_of_packets); 
 for(count_i = 0; count_i < num_prefixes; count_i++) 
  { 
  blackholed_prefix = (InetT_Address_Range *)op_prg_list_access 
(prefixes, count_i); 
  if (inet_address_range_check (dest_address, blackholed_prefix) 
== PRGC_TRUE) 
   { 
   ip_rte_dgram_discard (iprmd_ptr, pkptr, op_pk_ici_get 
(pkptr), "Discarded because destination address is blackholed:)"); 
   iprmd_ptr->blackhole_from_ptr->number_of_blackholing++; 
 
   printf("number of blackholing: %d \n", iprmd_ptr-
>blackhole_from_ptr->number_of_blackholing); 
   FRET (OPC_TRUE); 
   } 
  else if (inet_address_range_check (src_address, 
blackholed_prefix) == PRGC_TRUE) 
   { 
   ip_rte_dgram_discard (iprmd_ptr, pkptr, op_pk_ici_get 
(pkptr), "Discarded because source address is blackholed:)"); 
   iprmd_ptr->blackhole_from_ptr->number_of_blackholing++; 
   printf("number of blackholing: %d \n", iprmd_ptr-
>blackhole_from_ptr->number_of_blackholing); 
   FRET (OPC_TRUE); 
   } 
  } 
 FRET (OPC_FALSE); 
 } 
/* End Code Snippet*/ 
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Appendix D 
FTP THROUGHPUT WITH INTER-REQUEST Time of 60 
Seconds  
In this appendix we present the results for the FTP throughput with an inter-
request time of60 seconds. The simulations are for 0.1 second and 5 seconds Internet 
delay.  
Figure D.1 shows the FTP throughput between Router 2 and  Router 3 when the inter-
request time is 60 seconds.  
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Figure D.1 Throughput  for FTP application , inter-request  is 60 seconds. 
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Figure D.2 shows the FTP throughput between Router 3 and Router 2 when the inter-
request time is 60 seconds.  
 
Figure D.3 shows the FTP throughput between Router 2 and  Router 4 when the inter-
request time is 60 seconds.  
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Figure D.2 Throughput  for FTP application , inter-request  is 60 seconds 
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Figure D.4 shows the FTP throughput between Router 4 and Router 2 when the inter-
request time is 60 seconds.  
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Figure D.3 Throughput  for FTP application , inter-request  is 60 seconds.  
131 
 
  
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
0
8
0
1
6
0
2
4
0
3
2
0
4
0
0
4
8
0
5
6
0
6
4
0
7
2
0
8
0
0
8
8
0
9
6
0
1
0
4
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
0
0
1
2
8
0
1
3
6
0
1
4
4
0
1
5
2
0
1
6
0
0
1
6
8
0
1
7
6
0
1
8
4
0
1
9
2
0
2
0
0
0
b
it
s/
se
co
n
d
Throughput 4->2, FTP, Inter-request = 60 
Seconds
Shorten, FTP, 0.1, 20% MoreSpec, FTP, 0.1, 20% Community, FTP, 0.1, 20%
Shorten, FTP, 0.1, 50% MoreSpec, FTP, 0.1, 50% Community, FTP, 0.1, 50%
Shorten, FTP, 0.1, 80% MoreSpec, FTP, 0.1, 80% Community, FTP, 0.1, 80%
Shorten, FTP, 5, 20% MoreSpec, FTP,5, 20% Community, FTP, 5, 20%
Shorten, FTP, 5, 50% MoreSpec, FTP, 5, 50% Community, FTP, 5, 50%
Shorten, FTP, 5, 80% MoreSpec, FTP, 5, 80% Community, FTP, 5, 80%
 Figure D.4 Throughput  for FTP application , inter-request  is 60 seconds. 
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